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Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails:
Is That What Katz is Made Of?
Aya Gruber*
This Article takes the opportunity of the fortieth anniversary of Katz v.
U.S. to assess whether the revolutionary case's potential to provide broad
and flexible privacy protection to individuals has been realized.
Answering this question in a circumspect way, the Article pinpoints the
language in Katz that was its eventual undoing and demonstrates how the
Katz test has been plagued by two principle problems that have often
rendered it more harmful to than protective of privacy. The manipulation
problem describes the tendency of conservative courts to define reasonable
expectations of privacy as lower than the expectations society actually
entertains. The normativity problem captures the idea that the Katz test
allows reasonable expectations to be set by those who engage in
normatively disfavored privacy defeating conduct. The Article then
concentrates on two specific doctrines exemplary of these problems, the
third party doctrine and the contraband exception, and discusses their
ruinous effects on privacy in a technological era. The third party doctrine,
which roughly holds that third party exposure defeats privacy interests,
has severely hampered the ability of the Katz test to afford Fourth
Amendment protection to intimate online communications. Likewise, the
contraband exception, which holds that there is no legitimate expectation
of privacy in illegal items, proves exceedingly dangerous to privacy as
crime detection technology becomes increasingly refined. In the end,
however, this Article does not advocate trashing the Katz test, but rather
suggests methods of interpretation that remedy the manipulation and
normativity problems.
. Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law;
Assistant Public Defender, Washington, D.C.; Assistant Federal Defender, S.D. Fla;
J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., UC Berkeley. I would like to thank all the participants
in and organizers of the Katz v. U.S.: 40 Years Later Symposium, and especially
Professor Jennifer Chac6n of the UC Davis School of Law. I also praise the diligent
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INTRODUCTION
There are two great temptations felt by scholars analyzing Katz v.
United States and the "Katz test."' The first is to explore novel privacy
issues by playing analogy "smackdown." For example, my Internet-
provider-as-mail-carrier trumps your Internet-provider-as-bank-teller
analogy. The second grand temptation is to reference Katz issues
through the use of catchy double entendres. When criticizing the
Illinois v. Caballes canine sniff decision, one is often inclined to say that
Katz has "gone to the dogs."2  There is also the critique that the
California v. Greenwood garbage case "trashed" Katz.3 One could even
go so far as to say the pen register decision in Smith v. Maryland is
"phony."4 A perusal of the title of this Article surely reveals that I have
already failed to resist one of these great temptations, although the rest
of the paper is hopefully more than a game of choose-your-own-
analogy. Indeed, Katz represents much more than a mere opportunity
to engage in academic rumination and clever analogizing. On this
fortieth anniversary of the revolutionary decision, it is important to
consider Katz's legacy over the years and determine whether, in an age
of advanced technology, Katz proves to have nine lives.'
Katz was and is a revolution both as to the scope of individual
privacy rights and constitutional interpretative methodology.6 Until
Katz, the U.S. Supreme Court tended toward a literal reading of the
Fourth Amendment, limiting its protective ambit to "persons, houses,
papers, and effects."7  Katz not only broadened the operative
applicability of the Fourth Amendment, it also served as an important
departure from literalist constitutional interpretation. While literalist
methodology survives in limited areas of criminal procedure, most
l 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
3 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
4 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
I give Professor Chac6n full credit for the "Katz has nine lives" expression.
See, e.g., Marc J. Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1349, 1366-74 (2004) (discussing "Katz Revolution"); David A. Sklansky, Back to the
Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 Miss. L.J. 143, 153-54 (2002) (calling
"striking" Katz's rejection of historical approach to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's
Misguided Call For Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005)
(characterizing Katz as part of "Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution").
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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notably the open fields doctrine," it is now generally accepted that the
Constitution protects "people, not places."9
Katz's liberation of the Fourth Amendment from literal constraints
appears on the surface to be an unequivocal progressive victory, and
conversely a conservative defeat, because one would expect the
departure from textual limitations to broaden clearly the scope of the
Fourth Amendment.10 In its most civil libertarian light, Katz renders
the "persons, houses, papers, and effects" provision a floor of
protection the Court is obligated to exceed whenever a person exhibits
a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in a place or thing." Under such
a reading, the Katz decision and test articulated in Justice John
Marshall Harlan's concurrence has no potential to undo the Fourth
Amendment's baseline protections. 2
Unfortunately, while much of the language in Katz spoke of
broadening privacy protections to account for technological advances,
there are portions of the decision that planted the seeds of future
jurisprudence subverting privacy.' 3 During the last forty years, two
significant judicial developments have cast doubt on the assumption
that the Katz test could not possibly undermine the primary textual
protections of the Fourth Amendment. 4 The first development, the
third party doctrine, was established in business records decisions 5
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984).
' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
'0 See Thomas K. Clancy, A Vision of Search and Seizure Protection, 34 MD. B.J. 11,
14 (2001) (noting that Katz decision had initial "liberal gloss"); Corinna Barrett Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1430 (2004) (observing that at first
blush Katz appears as bold liberal move countering conservatism of time).
" See infra Part I.B (discussing Katz's liberal promise).
1 See Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court Dismantled
the Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 72 (2005) (suggesting that rigid
standard would protect individuals more than malleable Katz test); Melvin Gutterman,
A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of
Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 663 (1988) (asserting
that Katz initially affirmed protective potential of Fourth Amendment); Susan N.
Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 110 (2006) (asserting that Katz could have "provided an
opportunity for the Court to apply Fourth Amendment protection to more than
property rights").
1 See infra Part L.C for discussion of Katz's conservative potential.
1 See Herman, supra note 12, at 125 (asserting that under current Katz
interpretation "property rights are not even a floor").
is See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that dialed
telephone numbers are not protected); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443
(1976) (holding that bank records are not protected).
[Vol. 41:781
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and garbage search cases like Greenwood;6 and the second, the
contraband exception, grew out of dog sniff cases like Caballes."7
These doctrines twist the Katz test by denying Fourth Amendment
safeguards in situations where even a conservative literal
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment would likely secure
protection."8 Moreover, they are particularly troublesome in light of
emergent crime detection technologies and increased access to private
information by third parties via the Internet.
This Article explores how the third party and dog sniff cases run
counter to the liberal promise of Katz. It analyzes the dangers of these
doctrines as third parties become more essential for everyday
communication and law enforcement technologies improve.1 9 Part I of
the Article discusses the historical context of Katz and examines both
its liberal promise and conservative potential. Part II analyzes
Greenwood and demonstrates how, given modern modes of
communication, the case erodes privacy in the most intimate of
contexts. Part III explains how the contraband exception in Caballes
runs counter to Katz's recognition of privacy zones and discusses its
dangerous potential as crime detection technologies advance. Finally,
Part IV suggests some ways to reconceptualize the Katz test to
reinvigorate Katz's liberal promise.
I. KATZ: A POTENTIAL REVOLUTION
A. The Preceding Literalist and Trespass Paradigms
Prior to the Katz regime, whether a search of a place or seizure of
items implicated the Fourth Amendment turned on two questions: (1)
whether the place searched or item seized was one cataloged in the text
of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether the government
16 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
17 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (holding that testing of powder for presence of cocaine does not
implicate Constitution); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (finding that
dog sniff of luggage is not search).
18 See Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century,
65 IND. L.J. 549, 554 (1990) (stating that "in the two decades since Katz was decided,
the Court has applied the standard to reduce rather than enhance fourth amendment
protections").
19 See Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous
Technology, 75 MiSS. L.J. 1, 68 (2005) (arguing that as technologies improve, third
parties will have increasing access to personal information).
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sufficiently trespassed20  on a protected interest.2  Targets of
investigative wiretapping were liable to suffer defeat on both prongs,
given the Court's findings that conversations were not "papers or
effects" and wiretapping did not involve physical trespass into a
"house." In Olmstead v. United States,22 for example, the Court held
that the government's wiretapping of Olmstead's home telephone was
not a constitutional event because it was not a seizure of his "papers or
his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house
'or curtilage. '"'23 This strict literalist approach to the Fourth
Amendment" spurred a passionate dissent from Justice Louis Brandeis,
criticizing what he characterized as an archaic and limited reading of
the Constitution. He chastised the majority for failing to recognize that
"[tihe future is their care," and thus, the Court's "contemplation
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be."25
After Olmstead, the Court clarified in Silverman v. United States26
that when there is a physical trespass into a protected area, the
government may not claim that no search occurred because police
only "seized" a conversation.27 In Silverman, police used a high
20 1 do not use trespass in the state property law sense, but rather to signify some
physical entry into a protected area. In Silverman, for example, there was no violation
of state trespass laws, but the Court found a "trespass" under the Fourth Amendment
because the government had physically intruded on Silverman's protected area.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). Conversely, in open fields
cases, courts often find trespass under state property law, but no constitutional
trespass into a protected area. See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1199
(10th Cir. 2003).
21 See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 316 (1998) (discussing pre-Katz
approach limiting Fourth Amendment protection to tangible objection and physical
invasions).
22 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
23 Id. at 466.
24 Justice Hugo Black's dissent in Katz reflects the literalist approach with a
peculiar spin on the trespass-based analysis. He vehemently rejected that
conversations are protected, advancing a strict textual approach. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 365 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). As for the idea that any
invasion into a protected area is a search, Justice Black asserted that such physical
trespasses are not Fourth Amendment violations but unreasonable intrusions entailing
exclusion under the Court's "supervisory power." Id. at 369. He asserted that neither
seizure of conversations nor physical trespass into a protected area implicates the
Fourth Amendment, although the Court could police such physical intrusions on
other grounds. Id. at 370.
25 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
27 Id. at 509-10.
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powered microphone to detect a conversation within the suspect's
house.28 The Court found that the microphone's placement abutting a
duct outside of the house rendered the police action a physical
invasion and thus a search implicating the Fourth Amendment. 29 The
Katz majority opinion and Justice Harlan's concurrence characterized
Silverman as overruling Olmstead because it rejected Olmstead's
principal "ground that conversations were not subject to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment."30 Alternatively, Silverman can
be seen as prioritizing the trespass-based approach to the Fourth
Amendment over the literalist principle that conversations are
unprotected. 3  The Court continued to maintain that conversations
themselves are not "tangible objects" worthy of constitutional
protection. 32 However, it elevated and expanded the trespass premise
by holding that any minor physical invasion into a protected area,
even if to seize an unprotected thing, is a Fourth Amendment search.33
B. The Liberal Promise of Katz
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Katz to determine whether
the government's warrantless monitoring of conversations from a
public phone booth violated the Fourth Amendment. 34 Katz showed
an enormous amount of potential to expand individual rights because
it definitively marked the departure from the long-accepted literalist
28 Id. at 506.
29 Id. at 509-12.
30 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 n.* (1967); see Cloud, supra note 12, at
65 n.119 (noting that Silverman "is viewed as the opinion overruling Olmstead's
holding that only tangible things, and not intangibles like conversations, could be
seized").
31 See Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband:
The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1103 (1996)
(asserting that physical intrusion was "decisive difference between Olmstead and
Silverman").
32 See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509 ("Nor do the circumstances here make necessary
a reexamination of the Court's previous decisions in this area.").
33 See id. (finding that eavesdropping was executed "by means of an unauthorized
physical penetration into the premises"). Justice Antonin Scalia in Kyllo v. United
States characterized Silverman as recognizing the ultimate inviolate nature of the
home, stating "In Silverman . . . we made clear that any physical invasion of the
structure of the home, 'by even a fraction of an inch,' was too much." 533 U.S. 27, 37
(2001) (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512).
34 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49. The petitioner had originally framed the principal
issue in trespass terms, that is, "[w]hether a public telephone booth is a
constitutionally protected area." Id. at 349.
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concept that Fourth Amendment protections apply only to the
enumerated items.35 The Court rejected the argument that Fourth
Amendment protections are confined only to papers and effects.36 It
thus recognized that protection against unwarranted government
intrusion pertains not only to the physical contents of one's home or
property, but also to the intangible contents of one's mind.37
Moreover, the Court dismissed the idea that a place must be a house
or curtilage in order to enjoy constitutional protection. 38 The Court
held that the factor determinative of constitutional protection is
whether the person expects the place or thing searched to be private,39
stating that what a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."4  The
clear import of this analysis is that privacy in things and places not
listed within the language of the Fourth Amendment can nonetheless
be protected.4
Less clear is whether the Court completely receded from the
trespass-based analysis lurking in Olmstead and Silverman. The Katz
opinion initially seems to reject the trespass paradigm, stating that
"the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally
protected area."'42 The Court accordingly refused to define the Fourth
Amendment by reference to a list of protected areas, including homes,
and a list of unprotected areas, including open fields.43 However, the
35 See James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 650 (1985)
(noting that Katz's "monumental theoretical achievement" was to define protection by
reference to values underlying Fourth Amendment).
36 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
37 Id. at 353.
38 Id. at 352.
39 Id. at 351-52.
40 Id. at 351, 359 ("Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.").
"1 See Tomkovicz, supra note 35, at 650 (observing that Katz confirmed that
"[a]ctivity would no longer be categorized as a search or nonsearch due to its purpose
or physical qualities").
42 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. Many scholars take this language as an unequivocal
rejection of the trespass approach. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 6, at 152-53
(asserting that Katz "Court took the occasion [to] reject as obsolete the 'trespass'
theory underlying the Olmstead decision").
" Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 & n.8 (describing parties' delineation of protected and
unprotected areas and stating that any "effort to decide whether or not a given 'area,'
viewed in abstract, is 'constitutionally protected' deflects attention from the problem
presented by this case").
[Vol. 41:781
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Court elsewhere engaged language indicating that it considered the
phone booth a protected area, at least insofar as spoken conversations
were concerned.44 The Court stated of phone booths:
One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the
toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more
narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone
has come to play in private communication.45
Justice Harlan's concurrence also concentrated more on debunking
the notion that conversations are not protected from electronic search
than retreating from the "protected area" analysis.46 Rather than
deeming the place of search irrelevant, he broadened the category of
constitutionally protected areas to include public phone booths.47 He
characterized the phone booth as a "temporarily private place whose
momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are
recognized as reasonable."4 Moreover, prior to articulating the now-
famed Katz test, Justice Harlan noted that the protection the Fourth
Amendment affords will often be defined with reference to places.49
The determination of whether a particular area is "constitutionally
protected" in turn relies on whether the person exhibits an actual and
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or activity conducted
therein.5 °
The majority and concurrence's treatment of the trespass issue
nonetheless can be seen as liberal. The opinion broadened the
category of protected places to include any location where a person
can reasonably expect privacy, even if in public.51 More significantly,
the Court expanded the notion of trespass to include more than just
44 See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 158 (questioning whether Katz would have
reached different result if phone booth was not involved).
" Katz, 389 U.S. at 356.
46 See Blitz, supra note 6, at 1369 ("Harlan's opinion did not so much abandon the
doctrine of Constitutionally protected areas as update it ....").
" Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (asserting that "an enclosed
telephone booth is an area .. .a person has a Constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy").
48 Id. at 361.
49 Id.
50 Id. Harlan phrases the famed Katz test as follows: "[F]irst that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' id.
" Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
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physical invasions.52 Justice Harlan, recognizing the phone booth as a
protected area, asserted that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
unwarranted "electronic as well as physical intrusion[s]" into that
area. 53  This new broadened interpretation of trespass, although
perhaps less revolutionary than a total rejection of the "protected area"
analysis, has some very important ramifications. While in some aspect
tied spatially to a "place," Katz can be interpreted as proposing that a
person enjoys a roving "zone of privacy" wherever she may be, so long
as she has concealed those things sought by the government from the
prying eyes or ears of the general public.54
Thus, the spirit of Katz is a promise of freedom from unwarranted
invasions of privacy in all areas we consider intimate.55 Unfortunately,
the Katz revolution was not unequivocally liberal.56 There is language
in the case that laid the groundwork for the eventual erosion of
privacy rights. Looking back over the last forty years, one can now
pinpoint the dicta in Katz and portions of the Katz test that eventually
became its undoing as the Court swung to the right. 5
C. The Seeds of Conservatism
The Katz decision contains two reactive ingredients which
eventually exploded into a line of conservative cases providing less
protection than a literal approach to the Fourth Amendment. First,
52 Id. at 353.
53 Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
" Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 166 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (asserting
that Katz stands for proposition that people enjoy "zones of privacy" not defined
merely by reference to property law). In a different context, the Court held, "there is
a zone of privacy surrounding every individual." Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S.
469, 487 (1975); see also Lee Tien, Door, Envelopes, and Encryption: The Uncertain
Role of Precautions in Fourth Amendment Law, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 873, 874 (2005)
(asserting that Katz recognized "temporary zone of personal privacy").
55 Professor Tracey Maclin asserts that Katz "loosened [the Fourth Amendment]
from the ancient niceties of common-law property rules" and allowed for "thoroughly
modem and realistic understandings of the privilege against unreasonable searches
and seizures." Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 Miss. L.J. 51, 62 (2002).
6 To further muddy the water, there is evidence that the Justices themselves never
agreed on the true meaning of Katz. See id. at 91 (suggesting that Justices White and
Harlan saw Katz very differently).
51 One expert notes that "what ultimately emerged [from Katz] was an
amendment that was privacy bound, rising or falling in both scope and protection
based upon how the notion of privacy fared in the Court and within society as a
whole." Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1758 (1994).
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the Katz test itself is fluid, vague, and liable to produce wildly varying
results.58 Second, certain language in the decision hinges privacy on
an individual's precautionary behavior.59 The combination of these
two factors laid the groundwork for future doctrine defining
reasonable expectation as risk assumption, a doctrine that has shown
the potential to swallow the entirety of Fourth Amendment privacy
protection.6 °
If one were to identify Katz with a particular judicial tactic, one
could say it is really a case about moving from bright line rules to
standards. The fixed categories of protected areas and things gave way
to a test that invited the Court to determine the extent of Fourth
Amendment protections more broadly on a case-by-case basis. The
problem, however, is that the benefit of flexibility is often
accompanied by the danger that the case-sensitive approach will be
manipulated or manifest as arbitrary. Over the years, the Katz
decision has been the subject of two principle civil libertarian
criticisms: what I term the "manipulation problem" and the
"normativity problem." The manipulation problem describes the
tendency of conservative pragmatist courts to manipulate Katz's
requirements to defeat privacy claims in places or things society
considers personal. 61 The normativity problem is the charge that Katz
allows objectionable governmental or social practice to define the
scope of the Fourth Amendment.62
Turning to the manipulation problem, critics assert that both the
subjective expectation and reasonableness requirements of the Katz
test are vulnerable to political manipulation.63  Generally, subjective
58 See Clancy, supra note 21, at 340 (observing that "a conservative Court has
employed privacy analysis as a vehicle to restrict Fourth Amendment protections").
19 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (stating that Katz was
"entitled" to assume privacy because, inter alia, he "shut the door" of phone booth).
60 See Gutterman, supra note 12, at 665-66 (observing that subjective portion of
test invited "future members of the Court [to] apply their own beliefs" as to
reasonable precautions and expectations).
61 See Clancy, supra note 21, at 330-40 (describing how Katz test's malleable
nature has allowed conservative courts to constrict privacy rights); Gutterman, supra
note 12, at 666 ("By placing the fourth amendment on such an indefinite and shifting
footing, Justice Harlan laid the foundation for Katz to be used in the future to restrict
the core of privacy embodied in the fourth amendment."); Katz, supra note 18, at 556
(asserting that Katz test "leaves room for broad swings of judicial interpretation and
maneuvering").
612 See Maclin, supra note 55, at 89 (noting that "because it lacks any type of
principled norm, the expectations test . . . does not provide a substantive model or
neutral principle that protects Fourth Amendment liberties").
63 See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 12, at 665-66 (criticizing both Court's
20081
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beliefs are established through direct or circumstantial evidence that
the individual entertained a certain thought. 64  In the Fourth
Amendment context, there should be a near presumption of subjective
expectation of privacy, given that every case involves illegal behavior,
something people presumably seek to keep clandestine.65 However,
certain language in Katz allows courts to answer the subjective
inquiry, not by discerning actual intent, but by assessing
precautionary behavior. For example, Katz was "entitled" to Fourth
Amendment protection because, among other things, he "shut[] the
door behind him. ' 66 Later decisions have taken such language as an
invitation to manipulate the inquiry to say that a person has no
subjective expectation of privacy unless he takes precautions
satisfactory to the Court.67 This, however, has absolutely nothing to
do with the point of the subjective inquiry, which is to determine
whether the defendant actually did consider his actions private. 68
One may respond that such a judicial mishap has no consequence
because the second part of the Katz test requires the defendant's
subjective expectations be reasonable. Thus, the Court would have to
look at precautionary measures anyway to determine the
reasonableness of the defendant's belief.69 Reasonableness has many
permutations and surely an extended discussion of this oft-analyzed
treatment of subjective and objective prongs).
4 See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (holding no Fourth
Amendment protection given defendant's "frank admission . . . that he had no
subjective expectation that [he] would remain free from governmental intrusion").
65 Even without such a presumption, it is very likely that evidence will reveal the
defendant, no matter how misguided, believed that what he did was private.
66 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
67 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding no subjective
expectation because people in general know that they convey telephone numbers to
phone company).
68 One can only make sense of the subjective test as a type of standing
requirement; that is, a defendant should not be able to claim a privacy violation in an
area he never expected to be private. Nonetheless, critics assert that because of the
manipulation problem, the subjective requirement should be abandoned. See, e.g.,
James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A Tale of
Two Futures, 72 Miss. L.J. 317, 344 (2002) (stating that subjective test "is superfluous
or duplicative, at best. At worst, it has the potential to mislead lower courts into
denying legitimate Fourth Amendment claims.").
69 See Tomkovicz, supra note 35, at 655 (noting that defendant's precautionary
behavior has become important part of reasonable expectation of privacy analysis).
This runs counter to Justice Harlan's warning that "the burden of guarding privacy in
a free society should not be on its citizens." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
793 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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term is beyond the scope of this Article.7 ° Generally, however, a belief
is reasonable either when it is numerically typical or when it is a
minority position that otherwise has some logical or moral validity.
Thus, the most straightforward way for the Court to analyze
reasonableness would be to determine whether the typical American
would expect a certain action, place, or thing to be private.7"
Regarding precautions, there are some that render an expectation of
privacy unreasonable when absent, and others that do not. For
example, if one sets up an open shower on his front porch, it would be
atypical to expect his shower activities to be private. On the other
hand, a person who takes a shower in his home likely has not checked
every possible crevice or window crack through which a voyeur could
look. Yet, his failure to take such precautions does not render his
expectation of privacy in his shower unreasonable because the average
person does not take such precautions.72
After Katz, as Greenwood and related cases demonstrate, the Court
twisted the reasonableness requirement, holding that an individual
must assume the risk of government intrusion when she has not taken
truly extraordinary and even impossible precautions.73 Perhaps, then,
this heightened precaution standard can be justified as a normative
reading of the reasonableness requirement. In other words, society at
large might fail to take such precautions, but such precautions are
nonetheless preferable or morally required. The assumption of risk
analysis then creates incentives to take socially beneficial
precautions.'4 The problem with such an argument, as I demonstrate
70 For a discussion of reasonableness in the context of the Fourth Amendment, see
generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness, 2004
UTAH L. REV. 977.
71 Indeed, the Court gives lip service to this idea, stating that reasonableness
should be defined in terms of social expectations. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 & n.12 (1978) (stating that reasonableness should be determined by
"understandings that are recognized and permitted by society").
72 See Tien, supra note 54, at 887 (observing that Court "has been deeply
conflicted about how to handle the many types of precautions used in everyday life,
and especially reluctant to recognize predominant social conventions").
" See infra notes 132-47 and accompanying text (discussing assumption of risk
principles); see also Gutterman, supra note 12, at 666-69 (discussing Court's
assumption of risk analysis); David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on
Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 253-54 (observing
that "[aipplying notions of 'assumption of the risk' and 'knowing exposure' of
information or conduct, the Court severely limited both the physical areas and
personal conduct entitled to Fourth Amendment protection").
" Some law and economics scholars argue that there should be a disincentive for
not protecting one's personal space from outside invasion because such invasions
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in the next part, is that the risk analysis used to determine
reasonableness by the Court in Fourth Amendment cases has
absolutely nothing to do with whether the individual's public
"exposure" is voluntary, morally wrong, or inefficient. 75
Consequently, "assumption of risk" is a linguistic subterfuge that
paints the defendant's actions as voluntary or suboptimal when, in
fact, there is no logical reason to shackle the defendant with risk
disabilities, save for the basic desire to prioritize law enforcement over
76privacy.
Another way the Court manipulates the objective test is to substitute
the term "legitimate" for "reasonable." In cases like Caballes, the
Court considers, not whether the areas searched are ones society
typically holds private, but whether the thing eventually seized by the
police is "legitimate," meaning lawful.77 The Court's tendency to twist
the reasonableness inquiry into a tool to undermine typical privacy
expectations leads critics to disparage the Katz test as an invitation to
political exploitation.7" The test can deny privacy whenever "a bare
majority of justices concludes that even a vigorously exercised
subjective expectation of privacy is unreasonable." 71
Even when the Court does base reasonable expectations on societal
beliefs, it may produce less than satisfying results.80  Although the
Court is not manipulative, there is still a normativity problem because
our collective privacy expectations are often formed in response to
normatively disfavored behavior.8 ' For example, the government can
create external costs. See, e.g., Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law:
The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181
passim (1994). The response, however, is not that the typical actor should be
disincentivized as much as the deviant or voyeuristic actor should be punished. See
Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The Problem of Tort-Type Defenses in the
Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 203, 243-45 (1997).
71 See infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text (analyzing Court's use of
assumption of risk in Fourth Amendment cases).
76 Professor Melvin Gutterman asserts that, in fact, crime control was the explicit
goal this manipulative move was intended to serve. Gutterman, supra note 12, at 665.
71 See infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text (examining this judicial move).
78 See supra notes 60-63.
71 Cloud, supra note 12, at 72; see also Clancy, supra note 21, at 339 (noting that
lack of textual ground for Katz test "leaves the fluid concept of privacy to the vagaries
of shifting Court majorities").
80 See Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 825-26 (1999)
(stating that "Court has interpreted privacy to be a question of fact rather than a
constitutional value").
8' See Gutterman, supra note 12, at 731 ("By refusing to acknowledge normative
expectations of privacy in the face of government expediency, the Court has inverted
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implement overbearing policies that create lowered expectations of
privacy.82  Defining reasonableness thereafter with reference to
collective expectation allows government gamesmanship to defeat
basic Fourth Amendment protections." Similarly, private deviants
and snoops affect our typical expectations; and thus, defining
reasonableness solely by collective beliefs allows the Fourth
Amendment's parameters to be set by hackers and peeping toms.8 4
These examples illustrate the basic "is-ought" problem of the
reasonable requirement. At some level the constitutional inquiry must
concern not just what society actually believes is private, but what we
ought to be able to regard as private, regardless of the ability of the
government or others to penetrate our privacy barriers.85 Soon after
Katz, Justice Harlan recognized as much, observing in his United States
v. White dissent, "since it is the task of the law to form and project, as
well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the
expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling
them upon society."86
In the next two sections, I demonstrate how the Greenwood and
Caballes lines of cases have cultivated the seeds of conservatism in
Katz. These two doctrines have directly undermined the liberal
promise of Katz, manipulating the test to deny privacy in ways
contrary to basic intuition. In this sense, they have rendered Katz
more devolution than revolution.
the plain reading of the fourth amendment."); Tien, supra note 54, at 899 (arguing
that privacy rights should be ordered around natural evolution of collective beliefs, as
opposed to government-imposed lowered expectations).
82 See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 384 (1974) (noting that government could lower privacy expectations "by
announcing half-hourly on television that . . . we were all forthwith being placed
under comprehensive electronic surveillance").
83 The Smith Court recognized as much, observing that a "normative" inquiry
would be required if the government were to announce widespread searching. Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
84 See Sundby, supra note 57, at 1760 (observing that "because as governmental
and nongovernmental intrusions on privacy expand, the scope of what one reasonably
expects to be private correspondingly becomes truncated"); see also infra notes 181-83
and accompanying text (discussing hackers and Internet privacy).
85 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("By its terms, the
constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures assigns to the
judiciary some prescriptive responsibility .... "); Gutterman, supra note 12, at 665
(criticizing Katz test for "failling] to acknowledge that there are privacy rights to
which the people are entitled"); Tomkovicz, supra note 35, at 685 (stating that judge's
"task is to discern and impose norms").
86 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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II. GARBAGE PAILS
The third party line of cases, according to many liberal scholars, has
sounded the death knell of Katz as a liberal doctrine. Indeed,
Greenwood embodies both the manipulation and normativity problems
with the Katz test. The case is exemplary of a broader strategy of
watering down Katz through a jurisprudence of possibility, risk
analysis, and third party exposure. This type of analysis has
particularly disturbing implications in light of the modern prevalence
of private electronic communication involving third party service
providers.
A. Possibilities, Risks, and Third Parties
Greenwood held that garbage searches fall outside the purview of the
Fourth Amendment because there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in trash left out for collection.88 Initially, the Court appeared
to concede that Greenwood may very well have retained an actual
expectation of privacy in his trash, which was left outside in opaque
bags.89 As a consequence, the Court's analysis turns on the meaning of
"reasonable expectation."9  The Court came to the conclusion that
Greenwood's expectation of privacy was not reasonable by making
three principal arguments: (1) Greenwood exposed the trash to the
public;9 (2) the handling of the trash by third party garbage collectors
defeated its private nature;9 2 and (3) the trash items were in "plain
view. '', 3  The Court's plain view holding does not merit extended
discussion, mainly because the Court seemed just to misapply the
doctrine. As a consequence, Greenwood has not served as precedent
for the claim that the contents of opaque bags are in plain view.9 4
87 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 18, at 564 (describing assumption of risk doctrine as
"devourer" of Katz's privacy notions); Maclin, supra note 55, at 79 (observing that
"IeIxpectations theory and risk analysis replaced Katz as the defining methodology for
measuring the Fourth Amendment's protection").
" California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). It is important to note the
Court considered only the case of trash located "outside the curtilage." Id. at 37-39.
89 Id. at 39.
90 Id. at 39-43.
91 Id. at 40 ("Here, we conclude that respondents exposed their garbage to the
public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection.").
92 Id. at 41 (holding that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties" (quoting Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)).
93 Id.
" See United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that
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Thus, more troubling are the Greenwood Court's two other arguments,
as they create extremely dangerous doctrinal methodologies for
interpreting reasonableness.
1. The First Manipulation: Possibility vs. Privacy
One of the Court's main arguments is that Greenwood had no
privacy interest in trash he "exposed" to the public. The Court
appeared to concede, however, that Greenwood did not subjectively
believe that he had exposed his trash.95 Perhaps, then, the Court
mistakenly equated voluntariness and reasonableness. It is not so
much that Greenwood believed his trash would be seen by the public,
as he should have known it would be viewed when he voluntarily put
it on the curb. 96 Yet this is only true if the public harbors the general
belief that trash left for pick-up in an opaque bag will be seen by the
general public, including potentially the government. 97 Indeed, the
Greenwood Court attempted to make this very case, asserting that "[il t
is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public."98  However, the Court's
empirical support for its conclusions about "common knowledge" is
thin at best, indicating that the Court's treatment of reasonableness is
manipulative.
The Court cited a state case in which a dog "at the behest of no one"
dragged trash from the defendant's back yard to a neighbor's yard.99
That trash was eventually searched by the police, and the state court
Greenwood's holding does not mean that container contents, that are not in plain view,
are searchable); cf. United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 1995) ("We do
not read Greenwood as measuring the degree of exposure only through reference to
that which is in plain view.").
91 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39.
96 See Katz, supra note 18, at 563 (stating that Katz never meant "every limited
exposure [to] constitute a witting or unwitting renunciation of the fourth amendment
protection").
97 Professor Scott Sundby suggests that it is so obvious that we do not expect trash
to be private that it was "silly" for the Court to grapple with the issue in such depth.
Sundby, supra note 57, at 1792. He argues that the core problem with the Greenwood
holding is that it creates a world in which "government officials regularly examine[I
the contents of trash cans to maintain control over the citizenry." Id. On the other
hand, if all that was at stake was merely unprivate "fruit rinds and coffee grinds," id.,
then trash sifting would be an ineffective control mechanism.
98 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 53.
91 Id. at 41 n.2 (quoting State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224, 228 (N.D. 1985)).
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upheld the search's validity. 1°° From this, the Court concluded that
the possibility of animal tampering renders the expectation of privacy
in trash unreasonable.'' The problem is the state court holding
turned, not on the unprivate character of personal trash, but on the
fact that a nonstate actor (in this case a dog) was the one who
intruded on the privacy interest.0 2 The Court did not explain why the
possibility of dogs entering our yards does not destroy our yards'
privacy while the possibility of them rummaging through our trash
destroys its privacy. As Justice William Brennan pointed out in his
Greenwood dissent, while it is permissible for police to inspect "a
package whose 'integrity' a private carrier has already 'compromised,"'
the trash at issue in Greenwood was searched at the direction of the
government.10
3
The Court then discussed the case of a "[rjich lady" who rifled
through the town dump seeking proofs of purchase for refunds."°
However, this empirical evidence, itself scant, supports a different
proposition altogether - that society harbors no expectation of privacy
in trash items already deposited into a public dump. 0 5 Granted, it may
be unreasonable to believe that our trash will never become publicly
exposed. Our privacy concerns, however, are not just about people
viewing our trash, but about them viewing our trash, knowing it is ours.
For this reason, we attempt to keep our trash anonymous until it is
sufficiently amalgamated to prevent identification.' 6  One scholar
explains:
The expectation that attends one's contributions to these waste
streams is not secrecy but anonymity. A similar attitude
accompanies our use of the postal and telephone systems: the
names and addresses of correspondents and the numbers of
those called are of necessity disclosed to the system's employees,
100 State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224, 228 (N.D. 1985).
101 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41.
102 See Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d at 228.
103 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 41 n.3 (majority opinion).
105 Id. at 53 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating, "[H]ad police searching the city
dump run across incriminating evidence that, despite commingling with the trash of
others, still retained its identity as Greenwood's, we would have a different case").
106 See infra notes 161-69 and accompanying text (discussing anonymity and
privacy on Internet).
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but there exists an expectation that this information will be
treated as part of an undifferentiated flow. °7
The only actual example of private trash bag snooping to which the
Court referred is the practice of celebrity "trash-picking" by tabloid
journalists. 10 8 Again, however, this phenomenon is highly unlikely to
make the average nonfamous person believe that his trash will be
rummaged though by members of the general public.'0 9 The Court's
examples demonstrate that instead of defining reasonableness in terms
of society's actual beliefs about what is shielded from public viewing,
the Court manipulated the reasonableness inquiry into a disturbing,
dangerous, and unwarranted jurisprudence of possibility. It basically
held that the remote possibility of disclosure renders unreasonable an
individual's privacy expectations."0 Indeed, the closest the Court
came to doing any empirical analysis on views of the privacy of trash
was its canvassing of other court decisions."'
Let us assume for a moment, however, that the actions of various
snoops make the average person paranoid that someone is always
rifling through his trash. Arguing that Greenwood's expectation is
therefore unreasonable requires the Court to adopt the absurd position
of allowing untrained dogs and sleazy journalists to define
reasonableness." 2  In turn, the reasonably private person must be a
super-paranoid individual who has walled in his house, speaks in
code, buries the trash in the backyard, and keeps money under the
mattress. " 3 The Court therefore should consider whether, regardless
107 John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the
Protection, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1158-59 (1989).
108 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41 n.4.
109 See George C. Thomas, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James
Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1451, 1504 (2005) (noting that "if we fully expected sometimes to discover that our
trash was strewn all over the street, no one would put garbage in plastic bags").
110 See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 54 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The mere possibility
that unwelcome meddlers might open and rummage through the containers does not
negate the expectation of privacy in their contents any more than the possibility of a
burglary negates an expectation of privacy in the home.").
"I See id. at 42-43 (citing cases).
112 See Rudovsky, supra note 73, at 255 ("The fact that other people may steal,
vandalize, or enter our property to take this material can hardly provide legitimate
grounds for permitting the police to do the same.").
113 One scholar jokes that under current Supreme Court law an "Accidental
Tourist's Guide to Maintaining Privacy Against Government Surveillance" would give
the following advice:
To maintain privacy, one must not write any checks nor make any phone
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of the prevalence of voyeurs, people ought to be able to regard their
bagged trash as private. 1 4 The Court did undertake such a normative
inquiry, but ended up setting forth legal analysis even more dangerous
to privacy than its loose empirical analysis.
2. The Second Manipulation: Assumption of Risk & Third Parties
The portion of Greenwood most dangerous to civil rights is the
Court's holding regarding third party exposure. The Court found
Greenwood did not have a defensible privacy interest because he
"placed [his] refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it
to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted
through respondent's trash or permitted others, such as the police, to
do so.""' 5 The Court relied principally on Smith v. Maryland for the
proposition that voluntary exposure to third parties renders personal
items nonprivate." 6 In Smith, the Court held that the use of a pen
register to detect and store numbers dialed from a home telephone did
not implicate the Fourth Amendment." 7
The Smith Court began by speculating that society does not typically
expect privacy in dialed telephone numbers because individuals know
that the telephone company collects such numbers and can expose
them to the world." 8 However, most people would probably consider
the numbers they dial not to be general public information, whether or
not they are aware that the telephone company collects numbers." 9
While clearly manipulating the empirical inquiry, Smith did grapple
calls. It would be unwise to engage in conversation with any other person,
or to walk, even on private property, outside one's house .... I] deally, one
would take the trash personally to the disposal site and bury it deep within.
Finally, when buying items, carefully inspect them for any electronic
tracking devices that may be attached.
Sundby, supra note 57, at 1789-90.
114 See supra notes 60-62 (asserting Katz test should be normative).
"l Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
116 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979).
"17 Id. at 745-46.
11l Id. at 742 ("All telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers
to the telephone company .... ); see Jose Felipe Anderson, Reflections on Standing:
Challenges to Searches and Seizures in a High Technology World, 75 Miss. L.J. 1099,
1120 (2006) (calling Court's empirical conclusion "loose conjecture").
1.9 See Thomas, supra note 109, at 1502 (drawing "distinction between 'exposing'
phone numbers to the telephone company and putting my marijuana Christmas tree
in front of my picture window and opening the curtains"). Indeed, popular culture is
rife with examples of spouses calling paramours, giddy teenagers secretly dialing
crushes and hanging up, and friends arranging surprise parties by telephone.
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with the normativity problem.120  The Court stated that a normative
rather than subjective societal inquiry would be appropriate "if the
Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that
all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry [and]
individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual
expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects."1 2'
So then what differentiates the phone company's practice of storing
dialed numbers, at issue in Smith, from a hypothetical case in which
the government announces that it will compel phone operators to
monitor phone conversations at random? The Court hinted at an
answer by stating "a pen register differs significantly from the listening
device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents
of communications."'' 22 This is indeed a promising line of analysis, for
it allows the Court to differentiate between kinds of information
sought and determine the corresponding amounts of justification the
government must possess before obtaining them. 23 In the computer
context, while mass aggregate data or other relatively innocuous
information might not enjoy full constitutional protection,
information that conveys intimate personal details, communications
content, or navigation predilections would enjoy protection, whether
or not a third party Internet Service Provider ("ISP") had access. 24
120 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741; see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text
(discussing normativity problem).
121 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.5.
122 Id.
123 Unfortunately, in the modem era, the information that falls under Smith's pen
register holding may encompass far more than just telephone number information.
See infra note 151 (discussing Internet pen registers and trap and trace devices). In
1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994), which required telecommunications
carriers to ensure that law enforcement would have the capability to intercept
individual telephone calls and obtain certain "call-identifying information," including
the location of antenna towers used in wireless telephone calls, signaling information
from custom calling features, telephone numbers dialed after calls are connected, and
three way calling information. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 453, 460
(D.C. Cir. 2000). The carriers sued, arguing that under Smith, the companies could
only be forced to disclose telephone numbers. Id. at 459. The court responded,
"Smith's reason for finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in dialed telephone
numbers . . . applies as well to much of the information provided by the challenged
capabilities." Id.
124 Under the framework set forth in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title 1I1, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000 & Supp. II 2003)) [hereinafter Title 1111, and the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ECPAI,
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Of course, even the content/noncontent distinction has problems.
Justice Brennan warned that telephone numbers "are not without
'content"' and convey intimate information. 12 5  Nonetheless, an
analysis of privacy that rests on the level of intimacy of the
information sought is better than the analysis that survived from
Smith.126 Had Smith established a content test, the Greenwood Court
would have had a difficult time finding a person's trash is without
content.127  Unfortunately, the content/noncontent analysis is not
central to Smith, and the case is generally regarded as establishing a
very rigid third party doctrine. 28  The Court ended up defining
reasonable expectations, not empirically in terms of typical belief or
normatively in terms of levels of intimacy, but by risk assumption. 2 9
The Court held that a person who exposes private information to a
third party custodian must assume the risk that the third party will
share it with the government. 30  As a result the government is
permitted to obtain such information directly and
contemporaneously. 3'
the question of content versus noncontent information is often a central issue to the
validity of a search. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2000 & Supp. 1 2002) (allowing
government to use trap and trace devices with only court order and without probable
cause), with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (requiring "acquisition of the contents" of
electronic communications to accord with wiretap warrant procedures). Nonetheless,
judicial clarity in this area is very important. While the ECPA provides that the
content of email transmissions may not be intercepted without a valid Title III
warrant, short term stored emails (180 days or less) require a warrant, but not a
wiretapping warrant, and long term stored emails only require a court order. 18
U.S.C.S. § 2703 (2007). In addition, under the statutory scheme, it is unclear whether
email header information, click stream data, web commerce data, and the like should
fall under the provisions regulating content or the provisions regarding trap and trace
devices. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the
Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 51, 70 (2004).
125 Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., with whom Brennan, J., joined, dissenting).
126 See Freiwald, supra note 124, at 40 (noting that Smith "substituted the fact-of-
interceptibility test for a difficult normative judgment").
127 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50-51 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("It cannot be doubted that a sealed trash bag harbors telling evidence of
the 'intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life," which the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect." (citations omitted)).
12 See id. at 41 (majority opinion) (referencing Smith for unqualified proposition
that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties" (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44)).
129 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
131 Id. at 744.
,", The Court blew off Smith's argument that the phone company would not keep a
record of local calls from his phone, asserting, "We are not inclined to make a crazy
quilt of the Fourth Amendment, especially in circumstances where (as here) the
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Assumption of risk is a principal familiar from torts premised on the
concept that consent prevents redress. 132 For this reason, one who is
unaware of a risk cannot be said to assume it. 33 In addition, a plaintiff
who is aware of a danger "does not assume the risk if the danger
appear[s] to him to be so slight as to be negligible."' 134 It goes without
saying that neither Greenwood nor Smith consented to the
government examining their effects or third party disclosure to the
government. Moreover, though they may have been aware of the
possibility of third party disclosure, they likely thought that the
danger of exposure to the government or public was negligible. 135 To
be sure, it is difficult to understand how the Court could have thought
that Greenwood's consent was determinative given that, by statute, he
was required to convey his trash to a third party.136 As Justice William
Douglas points out, "It is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in context
where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic
alternative." 1
37
Perhaps the Court believed Smith and Greenwood failed to take
reasonable privacy precautions, adopting more of a contributory
negligence rationale. 3  However, a person is only contributorily
negligent when his action is unreasonable under community
standards. It is not wrongful or unreasonable to use the telephone for
communications or put out trash for collection, as opposed to using
methods that do not require third party services. In fact, using the
telephone to communicate and using city trash disposal services are
necessary, socially acceptable, and even desirable. 139  The Court did
pattern of protection would be dictated by billing practices of a private corporation."
Id. at 745.
132 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt. b (1965) (stating that "the
basis of assumption of risk is the plaintiff's consent to accept the risk").
133 Id. § 496D (noting plaintiff must "know[] of the existence of the risk and
appreciate ... its unreasonable character").
131 Id. § 496D cmt. b.
15 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (admitting that
Greenwood likely believed his trash would not be exposed); Smith, 442 U.S. at 742
(establishing only that people "presumably have some awareness of one common [pen
register] use: to aid in the identification of persons making annoying or obscene
calls").
136 See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 54-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Greenwood can
hardly be faulted for leaving trash on his curb when a county ordinance commanded
him to do so." (citing ORANGE COUNTY CODE § 4-3-45(a) (1986))).
131 Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 cmt. b ("Contributory negligence is
conduct which involves an undue risk of harm to the person who sustains it.").
"I See Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (characterizing telephone as
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not explain why an individual should suffer disabilities for doing
things that it otherwise encourages people to do.' 40
Instead, the Court elucidated an amoral risk assumption theory that
goes something like this: if there is some risk of third party disclosure
to the government, no matter how unlikely and regardless of whether
third party exposure was necessary or preferred, you have no privacy
interest. 14' Even worse, the Court has made clear that this rigid third
party analysis holds even when the third party has guaranteed
confidence.14 This doctrine quite obviously has potential to
completely undermine Fourth Amendment privacy protection.
Everyday, we expose private information, in differing limited
capacities, to persons of trust and essential service people. Meter
readers visit our backyards; cleaning people organize our underwear
drawers; 143 mail carriers temporarily possess our letters; 4 4 and
maintenance persons fix pipes in our sinks.1l4 1 Under the third party
doctrine, the possibility of disclosure from these parties renders all of
our homes and belongings subject to governmental intrusion.146
"personal or professional necessity").
140 Id. ("[Wihether privacy expectations are legitimate within the meaning of Katz
depends not on the risks an individual can be presumed to accept when imparting
information to third parties, but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free
and open society."); see also Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical
Surveillance: The American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 383, 400 (1997) ("[W~e only assume those risks of unregulated government
intrusion that the courts tell us we have to assume.").
"I See Gutterman, supra note 12, at 671-72 (noting that assumption of risk cannot
"be rationalized in terms of Katz's central theme: restraining government from
intruding too easily into people's lives").
142 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (upholding third party
doctrine where defendant revealed information "on the assumption that it will be used
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed").
141 Cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (finding reasonable
expectation of privacy in hotel room despite access by cleaning personnel and others).
144 Cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (holding that "packages
are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate
expectation of privacy"); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (finding
reasonable expectation of privacy in sent mail).
145 Cf. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1961) (holding landlord's
ability to access rented house did not destroy tenant's reasonable expectation of
privacy). But see United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding
no reasonable expectation of privacy in content of postal lockers maintained at post
office); United States v. Osunegbu, 822 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in content of locked rental
mailbox because rental manager had access to mail for purposes of sorting).
146 See Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically
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Today, the only thing preventing the third party doctrine from totally
destroying privacy is the near brightline protection the Court
normatively affords to homes and tangible items.'47
Although their conclusions about privacy rest on several grounds,
Greenwood and Smith have become synonymous with a simplistic and
broad version of the third party doctrine. They establish the principle
that any disclosure to any third party, whether a fiduciary or
temporary custodian, destroys an individual's privacy interest.
Remember, however, "[iun Katz, the phone company... no doubt had
the technical ability to hear the contents of [Katz's] call. That
technical ability, however, was no impediment to the Court's
conclusion that Katz had an expectation of privacy in the
conversation.' 4  The third party doctrine twists the Katz test into a
mechanism that undermines privacy. In Greenwood, reasonableness is
used to declare an individual's socially acceptable expectations
regarding intimate objects constitutionally irrelevant.
B. The Third Party Doctrine in the Cyberworld
It is well-recognized that the third party doctrine has the potential
to significantly impact privacy interests regarding a wide variety of
information conveyed over the Internet or relevant to Internet
subscription. 49 Because the Court has provided meager guidance in
Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 546 (2005)
(criticizing third party doctrine because "it treats privacy as an indivisible
commodity - once information is given to any one party for any one purpose, it is
treated as if it were given to every person for any possible purpose"); Andrew J.
DeFilippis, Note, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1108 (2006) (noting that third party
doctrine "conceives of privacy as an on/off switch, whereby an individual's disclosure
of information relegates his Fourth Amendment claims to the constitutional
darkness").
147 For a discussion of the bright line rule governing home searches, see supra note
33; infra note 322.
148 Patricia Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1375, 1405 (2004) (citation omitted).
149 See Bellia, supra note 148, at 1429 (suggesting that click stream might not be
protected because of exposure on third party server); Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1208, 1211 (2004) (observing that even email content might not be protected
under third party doctrine); Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94
GEO. L.J. 1087, 1118 (2006) (noting privacy ramifications of third party doctrine in
Internet arena); Solove, supra note 6, at 755 (suggesting that Court might find stored
emails and ISP information unprotected under third party doctrine); Daniel J. Solove
& Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357,
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the area, Congress has stepped in to regulate the interception and
monitoring of Internet communications and activities through the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"). 150 Yet the fact that
Congress has, to some extent, tempered the problems caused by the
third party doctrine should provide little solace to the concerned civil
libertarian. Congress is perhaps not in the best position to police civil
liberties, especially during times of moral panic over terrorism and
pedophilia. 15' Moreover, statutes often provide little incentive for law
enforcement compliance given their weak remedial mechanisms. 152
However, this is not an essay about institutional competence. Thus,
whether or not Congress is willing to fulfill the legacy of Katz is beside
the point.'53 This section looks at the implications of the third party
doctrine in the modern world and shows how far courts have come
from the Katz revolution.
1. Internet Subscriber Information
Internet subscriber information includes information that Internet
account purchasers give to provider companies (ISPs) and certain
information collected by ISPs, which the subscriber may be unaware it
maintains. For billing purposes, Internet providers collect customers'
377 (asserting that because of third party doctrine, Fourth Amendment is often
inapplicable in Internet context).
150 See supra note 124 (discussing ECPA).
"I' See Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 283, 297-307 (2003) ("[Llegislatures are unlikely to impose many new
limits on government misuse of personal information in the current atmosphere of
heightened national security and fear."). Indeed, the provisions of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("Patriot Act") makes government monitoring of
communications easier. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Supp. 2001) [hereinafter
Patriot Act]. See, e.g., Patriot Act § 209 (treating voicemail like stored email rather
than conversation); id. § 216 (treating email header information like phone numbers);
see also Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 917-18
(2004) (suggesting that Congress is unlikely to be spurred on by novel privacy-
defeating court decisions, given low judicial threshold for privacy protection).
152 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a), (c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (codifying
ECPA's explicit exemption of electronic communications from statutory remedy); see
Freiwald, supra note 124, at 83 (noting lack of statutory suppression remedy in
ECPA).
13 For a thorough and spirited debate of this issue, compare Orin S. Kerr, The
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) (arguing in favor of statutory rather than
constitutional regulation of surveillance involving modern technology), with Solove,
supra note 6, at 747 (opposing Kerr's view).
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names, addresses, telephone numbers, and credit card information."'
In addition, ISPs keep records on subscribers' login and user names,
passwords, and IP addresses, a number that uniquely identifies a
computer for the purposes of server exchanges.1 55
Typically, the subscriber information issue arises when police
observe an individual, identified by an anonymous username,
engaging in illegal activity on the Internet, often involving child
pornography or solicitation. The police then request information from
the ISP to match the username to an actual computer, name, and
address.156 This request for information is often in the form of a
subpoena or court order, but not always in the form of a warrant based
on probable cause. 57 Of course, targets of such investigations argue
that obtaining their subscriber information absent probable cause and
a valid search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment.158
Lower federal courts and state courts interpreting the U.S.
Constitution have analyzed this claim in two ways. Some courts
hastily dismiss the claim that there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy on the sole ground that a third party, the ISP, has access to the
information. 5 9  Others are more attuned to the nature of the
information provided, holding that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy because the information sought is noncontent
information. 60 The first type of analysis is incredibly dangerous as it
114 See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999), affd,
225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that "when Mr. Hambrick entered into an
agreement to obtain Internet access from MindSpring, he knowingly revealed his
name, address, credit card number, and telephone number"),
151 See United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 n.3 (D. Kan. 2000)
("The IP, or Internet Protocol, address is unique to a specific computer.").
156 See, e.g., United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (D. Md. 2005) (agents
discovered child pornography had been sent to Carols459@aol.com and requested his
identifying information from AOL); Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 504-05 (defendant
solicited agent posing as minor under username "blowuinva" and government
obtained information from ISP MindSpring to identify "blowuinva").
"' See, e.g., Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (administrative summons); Kennedy, 81
F. Supp. 2d at 1107 (court order); Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 506 (invalid warrant).
158 See, e.g., Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 506 (defendant asserted reasonable
expectation of privacy in his ISP information).
159 See, e.g., id. at 508-09 (holding that defendant was not entitled to expect his
web surfing and username to be anonymous because MindSpring employees had
access to information identifying him); see also State v. Reid, 914 A.2d 310, 313 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (asserting that cases finding ISP information unprotected
"followed inexorably from Supreme Court precedent which 'consistently has held that
a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties" (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979))).
'10 See, e.g., Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (finding no reasonable expectation of
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opens the door to undermining the privacy of the content of electronic
communications, click stream activity, stored documents, or any other
items to which an ISP might have access. The second line of analysis,
while less dangerous, greatly expands the third party doctrine to
include information far more intimate than the phone numbers
involved in Smith.
Turning to the latter approach first, these cases seem to follow the
promising strain of analysis in Smith by distinguishing between
content and noncontent information.1 61 Under this approach, courts
find that ISP information is not content related, and thus, like
telephone numbers, may be obtained by the government. 162
Nonetheless, Justice Brennan criticized Smith on the ground that
telephone numbers "easily could reveal the identities of the person
and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a
person's life."' 63 While telephone number information, upon further
investigation, might lead to the revelation of private and embarrassing
facts, compromising the anonymity of an Internet user immediately
reveals information about his associations and predilections.'64 In
other words, ISP information is inherently content based because it
instantly divulges to the government the websites the user has viewed,
chats in which he has participated, and emails he has sent.'65
As with garbage, the important privacy value is not necessarily the
immunity of Internet activity from public viewing, but the protection
of that activity from being linked with an identity. 166 Anonymity is at
the heart of our expectations of privacy and potential for creativity on
the web. 167 For this reason, the average person would likely be far
privacy in noncontent ISP information).
161 See Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181-82 (D. Conn.
2005) (noting that courts have found Fourth Amendment privacy to depend on
whether interception of electronic communication involves content); Sherr, 400 F.
Supp. 2d at 848.
162 See Freedman, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 181-82.
163 Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., with whom Brennan, J., joins, dissenting).
164 See Freiwald, supra note 124, at 48 ("In the context of traditional wiretapping,
there is not much besides the contents of communications to be acquired. But in the
online context, communication attributes convey rich information.").
165 Cf. Konop v. Haw. Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035, 1044-46 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that secure website information is "electronic communication" under
ECPA).
166 See supra text accompanying notes 106-07 (discussing value of anonymity).
167 See Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip,
and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 818 (1995) (asserting that Internet
anonymity promotes political speech on web); Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy
Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 288, 301 (2001) ("Privacy enables
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more agitated over someone looking at his click stream or knowing his
online identity than someone reading his phone records.'68 Courts,
however, seem to virtually ignore the value of anonymity, holding in
effect that because of ISP exposure, communicating in a chat room
under a username is the same as shouting the conversation in a public
square. 69  Nonetheless, at least the cases embracing the
content/noncontent distinction preserve the possibility that the
substance of Internet communications may be protected.
Unfortunately, another line of ISP cases adopts Greenwood's strict
third party doctrine. They hold subscriber information is unprotected
on the sole ground that such information is "revealed" to a third
party. 70 For example, in United States v. Kennedy, the Kansas district
court, citing Smith and Greenwood, broadly observed that "[wihen
defendant entered into an agreement for Internet service, he
knowingly revealed all information connected to the IP address
24.94.200.54 '1 and summarily concluded "[hie cannot now claim to
have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest." 7 2 The problem is that
although some minority of Internet subscribers might be passively
aware of the type of information exposed to an ISP employee, even
those users certainly do not intend for ISP employees to reveal their
usernames to the world or follow them on the web. 173 Moreover, the
anonymity and anonymity is privacy realized."); Sonia K. Katyal, The New
Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L REV. 297, 315 (2003) ("Perceptions of anonymity in
cyberspace have enabled a level of participation in public discourse unlike anything
before ... ").
168 Cf. United States v. Allen, 53 MJ. 402, 409 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (observing that
click stream information lies somewhere between (protected) content of emails and
(unprotected) subscriber information).
169 In United States v. Hambrick, the Court called the defendant "not a completely
anonymous actor" because of ISP exposure even though the court recognized that
"[i]t is true that an average member of the public could not easily determine the true
identity of 'Blowuinva."' 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999), affd, 225 F.3d 656
(4th Cir. 2000).
170 See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. McClure,
No. 1L05-CR-140, 2006 WL 89859, at *1-2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 2006); United States
v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F.
Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000); In re Property of Forgione, 908 A.2d 593, 607-08
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2006); Hause v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 1, 11-12 (Ky. Ct. App.
2001). This is true even when the ISP has specifically stated that it would not divulge
personal information. See, e.g., Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174,
183 (D. Conn. 2005) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy despite AOL's
nondisclosure policy).
"1 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 (emphasis added).
172 Id.
173 See Katyal, supra note 167, at 350 (noting that these cases create "troubling
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particular danger is that these cases pave the way for holding that
content of private electronic communications is not protected because
of ISP access.
2. Electronic Communications Content
There are a number of ways individuals communicate over the
Internet. Some are public, for example, creating a public website, 174
posting a public bulletin, 75 or engaging in a public chat. 176  Many
other modes of communication over the web are essentially private.
Email, for example, is a written message typically intended for an
individual recipient or group of recipients, and not for general public
viewing. Emails are transmitted over the Internet, and saved emails
may be stored on the Internet itself or remotely by an ISP. 177 ISP
workers and system administrators have limited ability to access
private emails with effort, much in the way that phone company
employees could listen to conversations or mail carriers could read
private mail. 78  Individuals also communicate privately over the
Internet via instant message or private chat, in which communications
are written in real time,'79 or by Internet telephone services like
contradiction" that individuals "expect anonymity, even when engaging in illicit
activities that are open to private surveillance"). To the extent that people actually
fear that ISPs monitor their click streams, it may be because of government
manipulation. See Anne Broache, Attorney General to Talk Data Retention with New
Congress, CNETNEwS.COM, Jan. 18, 2007, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588-22-
6151325.html (noting that former Attorney General Gonzalez urged legislation to
require data monitoring by ISPs).
1' Cf. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 425 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of public
website).
171 Cf. Guest, 255 F.3d at 333 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in
messages posted on public Internet bulletin).
176 Cf. United States v. Maxwell, 45 MJ. 406, 418-19 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in messages "sent to the public at large in the 'chat
room"').
... See Freiwald, supra note 124, at 45-46 (explaining route email takes from
sender server to recipient server).
178 First, "random monitoring except for mechanical or service" is prohibited by
statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000 & Supp. 1 2002). Second, there are practical
difficulties to reading email content. See Joseph Z. Fleming, Ethical Issues Relating to
Airline and Railroad Labor and Employment Law: Overview, SL040 ALI-ABA 1091,
1187-88 (2006) ("Because the specific route taken by each email message through the
labyrinth of phone lines and ISPs is random, it would be very difficult consistently to
intercept more than a segment of a message by the same author.").
179 One court found that although state privacy law is violated when agents
surreptitiously record phone calls, an agent's surreptitious interception and storing of
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"Skype."180  Finally, individuals may move from a public
communication forum, like a website, bulletin, or public chat room, to
a private forum, such as email, instant message, or private chat room.
It is common for individuals to engage in a general discussion in a
public chat room, and then move to a private room for more intimate
discussions.
These private communications are hardly different than phone
conversations or letters. 8  Regarding instant messages and Internet
telephone conversations, we no more expect that third parties are
listening in, whether governmental- or ISP-employed, than we would
expect third parties to listen in on our telephone or cell phone
conversations. Likewise, we no more think that ISP administrators or
web hackers access our personal emails than we believe that mail
persons or snoops read our letters. 2 Nonetheless, when it comes to
web communications, courts seem more than willing to make up a
whole new set of rules intensifying the third party doctrine to new
scope.83
Courts have expressed a tentative willingness to find no expectation
of privacy in the content of emails and chat room exchanges because
an instant message is not violative. See State v. Lott, 879 A.2d 1167, 1172 (N.H.
2005).
180 Unlike cordless phones in their infancy, Internet phone services are now
encrypted and not easily intercepted. See David Alan Jordan, Decrypting the Fourth
Amendment: Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced Expectation of Privacy
Provided by Encrypted Voice over Internet Protocol, 47 B.C. L. REV. 505, 530 (2006)
(noting that "today's encrypted [Internet phone] conversations are practically
indecipherable, even by the most sophisticated professionals"); infra text
accompanying note 300.
181 See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 199 (noting that cyberspace has been described to
include zone we occupy when communicating over phone).
182 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (discussing anonymity on web).
Perhaps one could argue that we do expect our private emails and instant messages to
be read by hackers and system administrators. See Bellia, supra note 148, at 1386
(noting argument that "we are conditioned to presume the vulnerability of our
electronic communications at various points on the Internet to hackers"). Not only is
this disputable, but also our lowered expectations may be a product of propaganda
"from companies seeking to promote network security products, by employers who
announce monitoring policies to deter misuse of network access, and by service
providers who seek to disclaim liability for security breaches." Id. at 1387.
183 The Eighth Circuit has indicated broadly in dicta that email simply might not
be protected by the Fourth Amendment at all. See United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d
1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002). One court went so far as to say that allowing a private
individual to use your email account renders invalid any claim that the account is
private. See State v. Kaufman, No. 32007-0-Il, 2005 WL 2746676, at *3 (Wash. App.
Oct. 25, 2005) ("Having voluntarily allowed a third person access to his Comcast
account, Kaufman cannot now claim a privacy expectation.").
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of ISP access, thus extending the third party doctrine well into the area
of content.18 4 At least one case, United States v. Maxwell, found email
sent from a private AOL account protected by the Fourth Amendment,
like postal mail.' 85 Even that case, however, took pains to mention
email always runs "the risk that an employee or other person with
direct access to the network service will access the email, despite any
company promises to the contrary."' 18 6 In addition, the court specified
that a message forwarded to several people might lose its protected
character. 87 Other courts have indicated in dicta that, because of
third party exposure, email content is of lesser protected status than
mail or telephone content 18 8 or possibly not protected at all.'89 Such
courts thus hold that the privacy of email depends, not on social
expectation or whether content is at issue, but on the fact of third
party access. "°
To be fair, many of the cases dealing with the unwarranted seizure
of email find no Fourth Amendment protection because the email
originated from a work account openly monitored by the employer.' 9'
184 See, e.g., Bach, 310 F.3d at 1066 (asserting that it is unclear that there is
constitutional expectation of privacy in emails); McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-
97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015, at *4 (Tex. App. May 28, 1999) (asserting
defendant's stored emails differed from tangible stored items because such emails were
"first transmitted over the network and were at some point accessible by a third
party").
185 United States v. Maxwell, 45 MJ. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996). Unfortunately, at least
one lower court has noted that Maxwell "has little or no precedential value because
the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces decided the case." United
States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999).
186 Maxwell, 45 MJ. at 418. The Court, however, concluded that "this is not the
same as the police commanding an individual to intercept the message." Id.
187 Id. This is akin to saying that the government may wiretap a conference call
because it involves several people or that if a conversant allows other private citizens
to listen to a conversation, then the government, without consent, can listen as well.
In addition, the court made much of the fact that the emails were stored on a remote
server rather than on the web itself. Id.
188 See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (1997) (finding
only "a limited reasonable expectation of privacy" in email messages and observing
that "[wihen an individual sends or mails letters, messages, or other information on
the computer, that Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy diminishes
incrementally").
18 Bach, 310 F.3d at 1066.
190 This is of particular concern because emails often go through different stages of
exposure to and accessibility by third parties. See Freiwald, supra note 124, at 45-46.
191 See, e.g., United States v. Zeigler, 456 F.3d 1138, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2006); Biby
v. Bd. of Regents, 419 F.3d 845, 850-51 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thorn, 375
F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds by
543 U.S. 1112 (2005); United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1133-35 (10th Cir.
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Courts rule that that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
work email just as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
work locker, when the employer has a policy of random locker
searches.92 Yet even knowing that bosses and IT people read our
work emails, we have to catch ourselves because one's instinct is that
what she writes in the little box is private. Moreover, the practice of
bosses reading private email seems no less iniquitous than bosses
listening to phone conversations that originate from an office phone or
reading mail left for postal pickup at the office.1 93 It also bears noting
that work email accounts often serve as individuals' primary private
email accounts as well.
Even more disturbing, when dealing with web communications,
some courts tend to mdlange the third party doctrine from Greenwood
and Smith with the consensual wiretap doctrine from United States v.
White"'94 and Hoffa v. United States.'95 White and Hoffa stand for the
proposition that individuals possess no reasonable expectation of
privacy against government agents posing as nonagent conversants
and contemporaneously recording conversations.1 96  It is fairly
uncontroversial that when a private person violates a confidence by
recording a conversation and transmitting it to the police, there is no
constitutional problem because it is only private action. 97 The more
complicated issue is whether there is a constitutional violation when
2002); Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Monroe, 52 M.J. 326, 330 (C.A.A.F. 2000); see also United States v. Geter, No. NMCM
9901433, 2003 WL 21254249, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. May 30, 2003) (holding
that government employee has no reasonable expectation of privacy in government
email account provided only for official use).
192 This does not necessarily hold for similar searches in the absence of such an
employer policy. See, e.g., United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 676-77 (5th Cir.
2002), vacated on other grounds by 537 U.S. 802 (2002), appealed after remand 359
F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.
2001).
193 But see Zeigler, 456 F.3d at 1145-46 ("Employer monitoring is largely an
assumed practice.").
194 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
195 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
196 White, 401 U.S. at 751 (holding that co-conversant's trustworthiness is
something "the defendant necessarily risks"); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (holding that
Fourth Amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it").
197 In many states, however, such action amounts to a criminal offense. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2007); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 934.03(3)(d) (West 2002); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-402(C)(3) (West 2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5703 (West 1988).
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one converses with someone clandestinely acting as a state agent. The
Court has held that it is unreasonable to expect our conversations to
be exempt from such monitoring because we must assume the risk
that our fellow conversants are wired undercover agents.198 However,
it seems that the majority of us, in fact, generally believe our co-
conversants are not secret government agents.199 Moreover, even if
that expectation is somehow atypical, there is a normative argument
that society members should be able to feel comfortable that in any
given conversation they are not being literally and figuratively duped
by government agents. °° Consequently, the WhitelHoffa doctrine
itself can be seen as a departure from the spirit of Katz.
Nonetheless, the White/Hoffa doctrine is narrower than the third
party doctrine in the sense that a person loses constitutional
protection only when his fellow conversant actually does breach a
confidence. Under the third party doctrine, an individual looses
protection simply when there is a risk, no matter how minimal, that
the third party might breach the confidence."0 ' If conversants are
treated like third parties under Greenwood, no conversation could ever
be protected by the Constitution because the potential always exists
that a fellow conversant might breach our confidences. Consequently,
to mix White/Hoffa and Greenwood would patently undermine Katz's
holding that the content of conversations is protected.2 2
Unfortunately, in the Internet context, lower courts have done
exactly this. When an individual chats directly with an agent privately
on the Internet, courts could simply dispose of the issue by invoking
199 See White, 401 U.S. at 751; Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
199 See White, 401 U.S. at 790 (Harlan,J., dissenting):
[Tihe expectation of the ordinary citizen . . . [is] that he may carry on his
private discourse freely, openly, and spontaneously without measuring his
every word against the connotations it might carry when instantaneously
heard by others unknown to him and unfamiliar with his situation or
analyzed in a cold, formal record played days, months, or years after the
conversation.
200 Id. at 785 (rejecting that "uncontrolled consensual surveillance in an electronic
age is a tolerable technique of law enforcement"); see also Gutterman, supra note 12,
at 670 ("In searching for 'assumption of risks,' White missed the mark. It overlooked
the central issue, the significance of this type of electronic surveillance as a threat to
our sense of security.").
201 See supra notes 115-16, 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing third party
doctrine in Greenwood and Smith).
202 Professor Bellia notes, "Katz's co-conspirator could have revealed the contents
of the communication at any time to police. His mere ability to do so was not thought
to eliminate Katz's expectation of privacy." Bellia, supra note 148, at 1405.
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WhitelHoffa and asserting that one has no expectation of privacy vis-d-
vis the behavior of a fellow conversant. °3 However, courts go further
and argue broadly that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
a chat room because fellow chatters have the potential to breach
confidences. For example, in United States v. Charbonneau, a police
agent became a member of a private chat room for surveillance
purposes and, as a member, received an email addressed to all chat
room participants containing illegal images. 2 4  Although the court
recognized that communications directly to the agent are not
protected under Hoffa,2°5 it went on to hold broadly that the defendant
"could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the chat rooms
[such that] the email sent by Defendant to others in a 'chat room' is
not afforded any semblance of privacy. , 206
Courts reason that private chat room conversations are not
protected because fellow conversants are anonymous and have the
potential to betray confidences. 0 7 However, if one were to meet
someone on the Internet and then call her on the phone, such a
conversation would not be un-private merely because the new friend
has not revealed her "true" name. Nonetheless, these courts deem
private chat rooms unprotected simply because there is a potential that
an anonymous conversant may breach confidences. This paves the
way for holding that private chat room or instant message
conversations may be monitored by the police, even when none of the
participants has consented to interception.
In the end, Smith, Greenwood, and their progeny far removed Katz
from its civil libertarian roots. Instead of determining typical
expectations or normative privacy values, these cases rely on a
203 See, e.g., United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (D. Ohio
1997) (holding that "a sender of email runs the risk that he is sending the message to
an undercover agent").
204 Id. at 1179-80.
205 Id. at 1184.
206 Id. at 1185.
207 See, e.g., State v. Turner, 805 N.E.2d 124, 132 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (stating
that "when parties make contact in a chat room, a private box opens up so that they
can have a conversation only with each other (instant messaging) [but] that still did
not give Turner an expectation of privacy, since he was chatting with a stranger, not a
known acquaintance"); State v. Moller, No. 2001-CA-99, 2002 WL 628634, at *5
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2002) (asserting that "individuals possess no reasonable
expectation of privacy in statements made to an unknown individual over the
Internet"); Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)
(finding no Fourth Amendment protection because "[w]hen Appellant engaged in
chat-room conversations, he did not know to whom he was speaking").
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capricious and unjustified analysis of risk assumption. The damaging
potential of the third party doctrine can be seen in Internet cases,
where very minimal and limited third party exposure was the
dispositive factor in denying protection in a vast array of intimate
communications. Notwithstanding society's actual expectations of
web privacy, courts tend to treat web communications as less private
than letters or phone calls, perhaps because of an instinct that third
parties are more essential to Internet communication or an overblown
belief in the prevalence of hackers. 2° The neo-Greenwood legal regime
tells us, not only should we expect others to be reading personal
emails, but also we ought to live in a world where curious ISP
employees, hackers, snoops, and the government can access our
private thoughts.
III. PUPPY DOG TAILS
Although Illinois v. Caballes is not as fundamentally damaging to the
Katz regime as Greenwood and related cases, it still illuminates how
manipulative the Court can be in order to serve crime control goals.
The Caballes Court considered whether police can employ a narcotics
dog to sniff a car for drugs after a routine traffic stop to issue a traffic
violation without probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion." 9
Because of the many permutations of the case, some do not regard
Caballes as requiring application of the Katz test.2"' Indeed, the Court
introduced a seizure analysis, noting that the dog sniff did not extend
the Terry stop beyond the time it took for the officer to issue the
ticket.2 ' It is true that the Court might have attempted to resolve the
208 See Freiwald, supra note 124, at 11 nn.6-7 (citing studies revealing that we
engage in intimate communication on web without taking precautions like
encryption); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1607, 1646 (1999) ("Those who make comments in 'chat rooms' or 'list servs,' or who
simply visit Web sites, are ... likely to have ... mistaken beliefs regarding the specific
level of disclosure of personal data involved in their activities."); Christopher Slobogin
& Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by
Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737 (1993) (conducting study and finding that people
consider computer searches highly intrusive).
209 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
210 Cf. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's
decision because of intrusive nature of dog sniff from seizure standpoint).
211 Id. at 408 (majority opinion) (noting that trial court found "the duration of the
stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries
incident to such a stop"). A Terry stop is a brief stop, like a traffic stop, which is less
intrusive than an arrest and justified by reasonable articulable suspicion rather than
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Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails
issue under a Terry analysis, holding, similar to Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 21 2 that a dog sniff is one in the "bundle of abilities" police
retain by virtue of making a traffic stop. This, however, would have
been difficult because a drug dog sniff, unlike removing the driver
from a car, as in Mimms, is not a necessary safety precaution. 1 3
Consequently, the Court had to strain for a justification of the canine
search beyond the general go-to justification of officer safety used in
most traffic stop cases. 4 It did so by holding that the sniff was not a
search because there is no "legitimate" expectation of privacy in
contraband.1 5 As a result, the Court's principal resolution of the dog
sniff issue is an interpretation of the Katz test that creates the potential
to erode privacy in the most intimate places given increasingly refined
technology.
A. The Manipulation: Reasonableness as External Legitimacy
The issue before the Caballes Court was whether the dog sniff itself
was a search within the meaning of the Constitution, requiring
independent justification. Under the Katz regime, the Court should
have resolved the question by determining whether Caballes had an
actual and reasonable belief that the contents of his car were private,
or, more specifically, immune from a dog sniff.2 16 The Court did not
address Caballes's subjective belief, but one could fairly assume that
he did not expect a dog to sniff his car when he was pulled over for
speeding. As to the reasonableness prong, the Court did not
determine whether society at large considers automobiles to be
impervious to such intrusion or decide whether we ought to be so
secure. Rather, the Court broadly held that a dog sniff is sui generis
because it is "likely to reveal only the presence of contraband" and
"any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed
'legitimate.""'2 7 This brand of Fourth Amendment logic can be traced
to an influential 1983 law review article by Professor Arnold Loewy,
probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).
212 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (holding that police officers without any basis could
order driver out of car after routine traffic stop).
213 Id. at 110 (finding interest in officer safety "both legitimate and weighty").
214 See id.; Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (applying Mimms rule to
passengers); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1048 (1983) (finding that reasonable
belief of danger during traffic stop justifies search of passenger compartment).
215 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-09.
216 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
217 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-09.
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which opined, "[O]f course [a criminal] would like to keep to himself
the evidence of his crime. But his claim is not a powerful one. 218
The manipulation ploy was to divert the inquiry from the
reasonableness of the privacy expectation to the "legitimacy" of the
thing sought by police.219 Yet today it is an unassailable tenet of
criminal procedure that "[a] search prosecuted in violation of the
Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light."220  As
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out in her Caballes dissent, "The
Court has never removed police action from Fourth Amendment
control on the ground that the action is well calculated to apprehend
the guilty. ' 22' The Caballes majority thus answered the wrong
question -. it analyzed whether Caballes had the right to possess
contraband rather than whether every driver has the right to be free
from dogs sniffs.222 As one commentator notes, "Focusing on the
police technique as a means to gather limited information about
218 Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1245-46 (1983); see also Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and
Targeting Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1477 (1996)
(hypothesizing that existence of magnetic field which prevented police for searching
innocent spaces would render "the lack of probable cause or justification for a
search ... largely irrelevant").
219 See George M. Dery III, Who Let the Dogs Out? The Supreme Court Did in Illinois
v. Caballes by Placing Absolute Faith in Canine Sniffs, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 390
(2006) (asserting that Caballes added "a new qualification for legitimacy" to Katz test
where legitimacy meant "legality"); David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the
Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 38 (1996)
(calling legitimacy test "judicial sleight of hand"). Professor Phyllis T. Bookspan
traced the move from "reasonableness" to "legitimacy" to Rawlings, a standing case in
which Justice William Rehnquist denied standing to the defendant, not because she
had no socially cognizable expectation of privacy, but because she was not
"legitimately" on the premises. Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant
Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 497 (1991).
She characterized this judicial move as an example of Rehnquist "adeptly employ[ing]
language to mold the law." Id. at 498 n.124.
220 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).
221 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Fourth Amendment protection, reserved for the innocent
only, would have little force in regulating police behavior toward either the innocent
or the guilty.").
222 See Gutterman, supra note 12, at 710 (asserting that this analysis misses "the
Katz mark" because although police technique "may disclose only the presence or
absence of limited information, it still remains as a method to disclose the contents of
private property in a private, enclosed space").
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contraband deflects attention away from the critical question: Is
uncontrolled dog sniffing the type of intrusion we should tolerate? ' 223
Caballes's manipulation of the reasonableness prong is a departure
from the "zone of privacy" analysis accepted both in Katz and previous
cases. 224 Justice Brennan criticized this doctrinal shift, stating, "In
determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been
violated, we have always looked to the context in which an item is
concealed, not to the identity of the concealed item. ' 225 Even before
Katz, Silverman held that the fact that conversations were exempt from
the Fourth Amendment's umbrella did not preclude a finding that the
police's actions were nonetheless a search.226 Silverman made clear
that any minor invasion into a protected area, even if to seize an
unprotected thing, is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. One might respond that no such trespass occurred
because the dogs did not physically invade defendant's automobile.
Katz, and later Kyllo v. United States, however, confirm that privacy
spaces can be invaded by nonphysical means.22 7 Indeed, "[a] dog adds
a new and previously unobtainable dimension to human perception.
The use of dogs, therefore, represents a greater intrusion into an
individual's privacy. Such use implicates concerns that are at least as
sensitive as those implicated by the use of certain electronic detection
devices." 
221
Caballes thus runs directly counter to Katz's liberal proposition that
any invasion into an area in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy is a search within the meaning of the
Constitution. It seeks to subject the Katz rule to a caveat that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply if the search is narrowly tailored
223 Id. at 711.
224 See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (asserting that Katz did not fully
depart from spatial view of privacy).
225 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138-39 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
226 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing spatial view of privacy
in Katz).
227 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text; see also Gutterman, supra note
12, at 709 ("The Court has always framed its analyses in terms of privacy expectations
that normally attend the location of the item."). Vestiges of the physical invasion
requirement have survived in part because of judicial confusion over the terms
"intrusion." See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS UJ. 1303, 1319 (2002)
(noting that "the tendency of courts to use the term 'intrusive' to apply to both
physical invasiveness and degree of prying into private affairs helps to explain why the
former has survived so tenaciously as a factor in the Katz test").
22 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 719-20 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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only to recover contraband. However, in Katz itself, the police were
extremely self-conscious, seeking only to monitor conversations
involving criminal activity.129 In this sense, one could argue that the
wiretap at issue, like a sniffer dog, was "generally likely to reveal only"
incriminating statements, which are "illegitimate."230 Katz vehemently
rejected this very line of analysis. In language completely ignored by
Caballes, the Katz majority declared, "[Tihis Court has never
sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably
expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily
confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with
that end.,
231
Perhaps Caballes can be justified as the Court's attempt to assert
normatively that dog sniffs do not compromise privacy. The argument
is that even if society expects their cars to be exempt from the minimal
intrusion of dog sniffs, such a belief is unreasonable because dog sniffs
only uncover contraband and are not intrusive. This is, however, still
a problematic judicial move. First, it gives the Court the ability to
elevate its own normative privacy-restricting views over the views of a
majority of ordinary citizens.232 Second, it is not necessarily true that
the average (innocent) person has no reason to fear a loss of privacy
from a dog sniff.
The Court must assume that it is unreasonable for one to expect to be
exempt from suspicionless searches that only turn up contraband. The
argument that those with nothing to hide should not be concerned
about civil rights is a common theme among crime control enthusiasts,
but it has been long since debunked by scholars and rejected by Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.233  It is well established that every
229 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967) ("It is apparent that the agents
in this case acted with restraint .... ").
230 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (quoting Brief for the Respondent
at 17, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923)).
231 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-58.
232 See infra text accompanying notes 316-19 (arguing that Court should face high
hurdle when elevating its privacy-restricting normative judgments over society's
views).
233 See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. The author of the Caballes
opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens, recognized elsewhere:
[Tihose who have found - by reason of prejudice or misfortune - that
encounters with the police may become adversarial or unpleasant without
good cause will have grounds for worrying at any stop designed to elicit
signs of suspicious behavior. Being stopped by the police is distressing even
when it should not be terrifying, and what begins mildly may by
happenstance turn severe.
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heightened level of police citizen interaction is fraught with risk, even if
the citizen is innocent.2 34 A sniffer dog, for example, could cause an
investigee to react in a manner the police officer deems threatening,
leading to the citizen's arrest, injury, or even death. The fact that a dog
search could only turn up contraband likely provides little solace to the
innocent person who wants to feel secure that such a situation will
never happen to her. Even without considering such a dire turn of
events, innocent people likely harbor an undifferentiated aversion to
government dogs nosing their private spaces. The Court is basically
saying that all these people are unreasonable because the only logical
reason for any discomfort would be fear of contraband discovery.235
Moreover, in order to maintain even facial validity of its normative
argument, the Court must be secure in its conclusion that a sniffer dog
can only detect contraband. If a sniff search uncovers any evidence of
legal activity, then the Court's assertion, that our beliefs about
freedom from dog sniffs are unreasonable because innocents have
nothing to worry about, unambiguously fails. Justice David Souter
points out in the dissent that the infallibility of a dog sniff is a "legal
fiction" because the empirical evidence reveals that dogs might very
well indicate false positives.236 The majority summarily dismisses this
point, asserting that "an erroneous alert, in and of itself, [does not]
reveal[] any legitimate private information. 2 37  It is true that dog
barking is not a human conversation, but it is only uninformative if
Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 465 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234 My former colleague Robert Wilkins, a brilliant African American attorney, and
a wonderful, smart, soft-spoken person, in what is now a fairly known case in legal
circles, was innocently driving home from his grandfather's funeral with his family
when stopped by a police officer and given a search request. Because, among other
things, it was the middle of the night, raining, and his family was involved, he
declined to consent to the search, to which the officer replied, "If you have nothing to
hide, then what is the problem?" The family was detained on the road while a canine
unit was called. When the dog finally arrived, Wilkins and his family were pulled out
of the car and made to wait in the rain while the dog sniffed around the car. Other
events transpired, and a lawsuit was filed and eventually settled favorably to Wilkins
and his family. See Complaint at 3, Wilkins v. Md. State Police, Civil No. MJG-93-468
(D. Md. 1993), cited in Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 425, 440 n. 97 (1997); Settlement Agreement, Wilkins v. Md. State Police, Civil
No. MJG-93-468 (D. Md. 1993), cited in Davis, supra, at 440 n.99. For a more in-
depth discussion of this story, see id. at 438-42. Clearly, the damage suffered by the
Wilkins family had absolutely nothing to do with the discovery of contraband.
235 But see infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text (illustrating intrusiveness of
canine searches).
236 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
237 Id. at 409 (majority opinion).
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viewed in a vacuum. "[In practice, the government's use of a trained
narcotics dog functions as a limited search to reveal undisclosed facts
about private enclosures, to be used to justify a further and complete
search of the enclosed area. '2 38 If fallible, this limited search actually
reveals information about noncontraband items that the police will
undoubtedly perceive with their own senses.2 39 The dog sniff is really
no different than the thermal imaging device used in Kyllo, which
disclosed limited information, not immediately interpretable as an
observation, but potentially leading to a privacy-invading inspection.
The Court found the use of such a device to be a search.24
The Caballes Court's argument that dog sniffs are not intrusive is
likewise unconvincing. If "intrusive" means physically invading or
intimidating,24' the Court's conclusion that a dog sniff is not
intimidating defies common sense. One recent article's hypothetical
underscores the menacing nature of this investigative technique:
Imagine that you are a pedestrian standing on a busy street
corner in broad daylight, or a motorist sitting in your car
waiting for the light to change, or simply sitting in your
parked car. Suddenly, you notice a police officer approaching
you with a large black police dog on a tight leash with a
muzzle around its jaws. Without uttering a word of warning
or explanation . . . the police officer then conducts what is
referred to as a "sniff-around," by walking the dog around
your person or your car, while the dog sniffs you or your car.
Suddenly, the dog stops by your side, its nose close to your leg
or your car door and begins pawing at you .... On the basis
of this alert, the police officer then orders you to surrender
your bags or to exit your car and submit to a search. This is
not a request; it is a directive that you may not refuse. 42
238 Id. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
239 That is not, however, the way people feel, with good reason. Some argue that
the correct solution to this problem is to prevent courts from equating a positive dog
sniff with probable cause for the larger search. See, e.g., Richard E. Myers II, Detector
Dogs and Probable Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 8 (2006). Unfortunately, even this
solution falls short of Katz's promise. First, this does not necessarily solve the false
positive problem. Moreover, there are still problems with calling our beliefs that we
are immune from dog sniffs unreasonable, even if they are assumed to be 100%
accurate.
240 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
241 Thus, the Court focused on the fact that "the dog sniff was performed on the
exterior of respondent's car while he was lawfully seized." Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
242 Cecil J. Hunt I, Calling in the Dogs: Suspicionless Sniff Searches and Reasonable
[Vol. 41:781
Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails
Of course, not every dog sniff will be so intimidating. However, the
Court does not differentiate between types of canine sniffs, deeming
some intrusive and others benign. Instead, the Court makes a blanket
statement that dog sniffs are not searches.
B. Caballes and New Technologies
The import of the Caballes ruling is that the more investigative
techniques are tailored to detect only contraband, the less members of
the public, both innocent and guilty alike, can expect to be shielded
from their intrusions.243 Back in 1984, Justice Brennan forewarned
that such analysis would prove Orwellian in an age of technology,
stating that "if a device were developed that could detect, from the
outside of a building, the presence of cocaine inside, there would be
no Constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through a residential
neighborhood and using the device to identify all homes in which the
drug is present. 24 4 Today, the government has the capability of using
and further refining contraband detecting machines. 45 If Caballes
stands for the broad proposition that there is no search when only
contraband is detected, then the government is free to deploy such
devices in each and every one of our houses on the ground that if we
are innocent, we have nothing to hide.246 Big Brother could be in all
our lives, with the caveat that he only transmit evidence of illegal
activity to the government.
Expectations of Privacy, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (2005).
243 Almost 20 years ago, one scholar forewarned of the effects of the Court's dog
sniff holding in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983): "Brave new worlds in
which all passersby are scanned for drugs and police cruising through residential
neighborhoods probe all homes with futuristic devices that disclose only whether the
offending substance is present come quickly to mind." Junker, supra note 107, at
1140.
244 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245 See Steven G. Brandl, Reflections on the Criminal Justice System After September
11, 2001: Back to the Future: The Implications of September 11, 2001 on Law
Enforcement Practice and Policy, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 148 (2003) (stating that
"[iit is likely that the discovery and adoption of technology for crime detection and
investigation purposes will continue to progress at an accelerated 'information age'
pace").
246 There would be no problem with a machine that could scan our papers for
evidence of crime, something that would be abhorrent to the Framers and early Court.
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (condemning use of compulsory
process to seize papers as "invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property").
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This debate is not merely academic. Every day, crime detection
technology advances. Hand-held devices that identify the presence of
weapons under clothing are becoming more accurate.247 Computers
now have the capability to cull our Internet communications and
transmit to the police only the portions that indicate illegality. 48
Facial recognition technologies are already in use,2 49 and "sniffer
chips" can detect trace amounts of illegal substances.2"' Under
Caballes, all these devices could be employed on the sole bases of
police hunches, whims, prejudices, or anything at all, because they are
beyond the purview of the Fourth Amendment.
Consider the hypotheticals of a camera placed in the home that only
transmits images of illegal activities to the police and a device attached
to our computers that scans only for illegal files. Some might argue
that the use of such devices does not implicate privacy. Professor Orin
Kerr, for example, asserts that "a search of data stored on a hard drive
occurs when that data, or information about that data, is exposed to
human observation.""25 To him, the lynchpin of a violation of privacy
is the revelation of information to the human senses of the police.
Professor Richard Salgado, combining this notion of privacy with the
ruling in Caballes, contends the employment of a computer hash
program that inspects electronic communications for illegal activity
and transmits only information of illegality to the police is not a
search under the Fourth Amendment.252
What Kerr and Salgado discount is the idea that data-amassing
machines, even when collecting "blind," are virtual manifestations of
invasive police power, inseparable from human governmental
conduct. For this reason, the contention that no search occurs until
there is human perception runs counter to typical beliefs about
247 See Laura B. Riley, Comment, Concealed Weapon Detectors and the Fourth
Amendment: The Constitutionality of Remote Sense-Enhanced Searches, 45 UCLA L. REV.
281, 289-91 (1997) (discussing gun detection technology).
248 See Brandl, supra note 245, at 149 (discussing computer programs able to
search vast datasets for specific keywords).
249 See Bridget Mallon, Comment, "Every Breath You Take, Every Move You Make,
I'll Be Watching You": The Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 48 VILL. L. REV. 955,
957-62 (2003) (discussing facial recognition technology).
250 Brandl, supra note 245, at 148 (discussing biometric technologies that can
detect trace amounts of illegal substances).
251 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARv. L. REV. 531,
548 (2005).
252 Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119
HARV. L. REV. 38, 38 (2005) (stating that "the use of hashing to find only files that
constitute contraband does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search").
[Vol. 41:781
Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails
253privacy.  Indeed, Kerr admits that "[tihe idea that the government
could freely generate copies of our hard drives and indefinitely retain
them in government storage seems too Orwellian - and downright
creepy - to be embraced as a Fourth Amendment rule. '214 Similarly
Salgado states that "there would be something very creepy about an
expansive and unrestrained search through media .... 255 I would
like to imbue with content our feelings of unease (or "creepiness") at
government intrusion geared toward contraband detection.
The Caballes Court puts a normative stamp of approval on a world
in which police dogs sniff us at will, computers constantly inspect our
communications, facial recognition machines scan our features, and
contraband detection machines are directed at our homes, cars, and
bodies.25 6 If, as the Supreme Court believes, none of these actions
impinge on legitimate privacy, why does this world appear so
unabashedly draconian?
In addition to our awareness of the increased risks associated with
police interactions in general, discussed above, we fear such devices
because we do not believe in the infallibility of the techniques or
incorruptibility of government actors. 257 Even knowing that certain
techniques are highly accurate, we might nonetheless think that this
one time the technique will fail or a corrupt police person will use the
technology in an unfair way.258 The Caballes Court might respond
that this is a misplaced concern because the vast majority of the time
nothing would go wrong. However, our beliefs about privacy do not
necessarily hinge on statistical probabilities. To us, the consequences
of a slip up or unethical officer are so dire that the very use of the
enabling technique causes us to be insecure in our persons, houses,
papers, and effects.259 Consequently, the assumption that privacy is
253 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (asserting Orwellian nature of such actions). But see Simmons, supra note
227, at 1357 (arguing that this "instinctive reaction to such techniques seems
misplaced").
254 Kerr, supra note 251, at 560.
255 Salgado, supra note 252, at 38.
256 See Jonathan Zittrain, Searches and Seizures in a Networked World, 119 HARv. L.
REV. F. 83 (2005) (objecting to Kerr's analysis on ground that it permits sweeping
governmental action without concurring requirement of judicial oversight).
257 Indeed, in the cyberworld, this belief is compounded by definitional vagueness
regarding illegal web activities. See Adler, supra note 31, at 1117.
258 See id. at 1112 (asserting that any search "that eliminates an individual's control
over the boundaries to her most private realms would likely be perceived as a
threatening exercise of coercive power").
259 Justice Harlan has urged that the principle question courts must answer is "the
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not implicated by a contraband search not only assumes the
infallibility of the detection technology, but the good intentions of
those who use it.
260
Second, even accepting the absolute infallibility of the technique
and the ultimate good faith of individual officers, the use of a
contraband detection device is still likely to be seen as an invasion of
privacy because of our proprietary notions of privacy. When we think
of a thing or an area as private, we believe that we control the destiny
of that thing or area. 261 We entertain a proprietary notion that the
government may not dictate how and when our zones of privacy are
monitored, even if such monitoring can reveal only contraband.262 For
example, my proprietary notion of my home dictates that I and I alone
determine what may go on in that home.263 Consequently, everything
that happens in my house, even that which is (gulp) illegal, is immune
from unwarranted government observation.264 I may not have the
right to commit a crime, but I do have the right to keep criminal
evidence in my home a secret.2 65 The government may not invade my
likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security .... " United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
260 Katz made clear, however, that proffered good faith does not adequately
substitute for the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 231 and accompanying text; see
also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding.").
261 See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment Right to Delete, 119 HARv. L. REV. F. 10
(2005), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/dec05/
ohm.shtml (asserting that private property right includes ability to dispose of
property, to erase it from existence at will, and thus copying and preserving data files,
even without human perusal, infringes privacy).
262 See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LJ. 475, 482 (1968) (defining privacy as
"control we have over information about ourselves").
263 See Clancy, supra note 21, at 368-69 ("The proper question is whether the
papers or personal property are mine, whether the house is mine, whether the body is
mine? If the answer is yes, then one has the right to exclude the government from
searching or seizing.").
264 I gulp because one would be quick to counter that "[i]f a person has no
legitimate interest in concealing wrongdoing, he should also have no legitimate
interest in withholding information about whether or not there was any wrongdoing
in the first place." The Supreme Court, 2004 Term - Leading Cases, 119 HARv. L. REV.
179, 188 (2005). However, it is incorrect to assume that one's desire to be immune
from all government surveillance, even surveillance that can only detect illegal
activity, is no more than the bare desire to conceal criminal activity. If it were so
simple, one could not account for the fact that innocent persons, who have never
committed crimes in their lives, do not want to be subjected to such surveillance.
2615 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("No right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
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home in the search of contraband, because it would negate an
important aspect of what it means for that home to be my private
space.266 Silverman put it bluntly:
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his
house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the
knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the
Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty - worth
protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized
society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from
public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some
inviolate place which is a man's castle.267
IV. CALLING IN THE DOGS - SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Because of the many nuances of the Katz test, and the various
doctrinal and philosophical difficulties in implementing it,268 some
have called for its wholesale rejection and replacement.269 My project
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint ... (quoting Union
Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))); Froomkin, supra note 167, at 838-
40 (asserting that essential ingredient of privacy is ability to keep one's secrets).
266 In a similar vein, Professor Michael Froomkin describes "informational privacy"
as "the ability to control the acquisition or release of information about oneself' and
as "a good in itself." A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461, 1463, 1467 (2000).
267 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 n.4 (1961) (quoting United States
v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), affd, 343 U.S.
747 (1952)). Thus, even "blind" technology searches infringe on our private spaces
and may, in turn, lead to the chilling of the creative possibilities in those spaces. See
supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing privacy and creativity); see also
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 447 (1980) (discussing
that privacy is essential for "learning, writing and all forms of creativity").
268 See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme
Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 Miss. LJ. 5, 26 (2002); Sklansky,
supra note 6, at 158 ("The [Katz] inquiry has proved distressingly indeterminate, and
many observers, on and off the Court, have thought it circular.").
2169 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 146, at 562-63 (suggesting that Court "jettison"
Katz test and return to text); Herman, supra note 12, at 125 (suggesting that Katz
framework be replaced with test modeled on procedural due process); Swire, supra
note 151, at 924-32 (declaring death of Katz and proposing test under which new
police surveillance techniques are presumptively unreasonable unless carried out
pursuant to particularized rules); see Luna, supra note 80, at 788 ("Academics of all
stripes agree that search and seizure law is a 'mess' and have offered their own fix-it
guides for the Fourth Amendment."); cf. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a
Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (theorizing search and seizure law
from ground up without "dogma" of existing case law).
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is more modest because I believe that with a rearrangement of
priorities, the Court can fulfill the revolutionary promise of Katz. I
suggest that Katz's problems might be mitigated by a two-step process
of empirical determination of typical belief followed by a normative
determination of the parameters of privacy. 270 First, the Court should
ask whether an expectation is typical.271 If it is, then it is not for the
Court to say that such an expectation is nonetheless unreasonable.
Second, if the expectation is not typical, the Court should make its
own judgment whether one ought to be able to expect privacy in that
area. It is likely that a strict adherence to a primary empirical and
secondary normative analysis would necessitate the elimination of the
third party doctrine and rejection of Caballes' contraband exception.272
A. Tempering the Manipulation Problem
There is no question Katz's "reasonableness" requirement has its
problems. As Professor Erik Luna explains, "The Fourth Amendment
reasonableness test contains the vice of degenerative self-definition,
with each unimpeded intrusion providing a new baseline against
which all subsequent modes of government surveillance will be
measured. '27 3 Given the obvious problems with the Katz test over the
past forty years, some scholars have advocated reverting to the practice
of defining the Fourth Amendment in terms of bright line rules.274
However, Katz's very fundamental flaw also embodies its most
glorious promise for liberation. Reasonableness is the mechanism
through which the Fourth Amendment can be a fluid protector of
rights, rather than an outmoded relic tethered to no-longer-sufficient
categories. 27" For this reason, the re-importation of bright line rules as
270 See infra notes 277-82, 320-23 and accompanying text (laying out this process).
271 See generally Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 208 (discussing
methodologies for quantifying typical social expectations of privacy).
272 Many have suggested that the Court reject the third party and dog sniff lines of
cases. See Bellia, supra note 148, at 1411-12 (asserting that third party cases be read
to deny Fourth Amendment protection only when third party has access to
information and there is separate determination that person retains no reasonable
expectation of privacy); Sundby, supra note 57, at 1777 (arguing that citizen-
government trust, not assumption of risk, should be central Fourth Amendment
inquiry).
273 Luna, supra note 80, at 794-95.
274 See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 268-301 (1993) (asserting that reasonableness standard
has utterly failed and instead suggesting rules-based model); Kerr, supra note 251, at
533-34.
275 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting Justice Brandeis's critique of
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a substitute for a meaningful reasonableness analysis is ultimately
unsatisfying. To revive the literal categories as some constraint when
the Court gets Katz's reasonableness requirement wrong is merely to
revive Olmstead, leaving vast arenas of intimate conduct subject to
monitoring.276
To ensure that courts do not manipulate the Katz reasonableness
inquiry, reasonableness should be defined in terms of typical social
expectations.277 Simply, the Court should not be able to declare a
subjective expectation of privacy unreasonable if it is one that is
generally entertained by society. Formulating a detailed proposal for
discerning typical social expectation 278 or recommending a particular
scientific method 79 is unfortunately beyond the scope of this Article.
I am arguing, however, that the Court should, at a basic level,
integrate some empirical analysis regarding society's beliefs into its
determination of reasonable expectation of privacy. 280 The Court is
intimately familiar with the different methodologies for determining
social expectations on a wide variety of matters, and it has various
techniques for divining the feeling of relevant communities regarding
specific social issues.28' In addition to preventing manipulation, a
Olmstead's archaic nature).
276 This problem is illustrated by the lower level status that many courts ascribe to
people's cyberspaces. They tend to look at the Internet as a quintessentially
nonprivate area, regardless of the fact that many people consider their computer
activities incredibly private. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing manipulation
problem).
278 Sundby suggests bypassing the empirical inquiry all together and only engaging
in a normative determination of what police actions compromise citizen-government
trust. Sundby, supra note 57, at 1777.
279 Professors Slobogin and Schumacher have suggested an empirical methodology
for canvassing social expectations regarding privacy. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra
note 208, at 728.
280 William Heffernan suggests privacy be found first "[wihen it appears that
conventional sources of vulnerability are at stake . . . [unless] an insider has
affirmatively indicated her willingness to disclose them" or "when privacy cues are
employed as signals for objects or information that do not normally generate a sense
of vulnerability." William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 67 (2002). Another (admittedly imperfect) methodology
would be for the Justices to simply look at their own life experiences. See Cloud,
supra note 268, at 31-32 (asserting that from personal perspective, Justices would be
hard pressed to argue that they do not expect their backyards to be free from aerial
surveillance).
281 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561, 605 (2005) (determining
"evolving standards of human decency" through national consensus evidence and the
court's own judgment); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining
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focus on typical social expectations will have the ancillary benefit of
ensuring that the Court does not focus on law enforcement
expediency as part of its determination of whether the police action is
a search.2
82
It is quite apparent that the Court has not adopted a typicality
approach to reasonable expectation. Instead, it has characterized
privacy expectations as per se unreasonable because of remote
possibilities of exposure,283 assumption of risk,2"' illegality of the
sought item,"' or lack of physical intrusion. 86 There is some
promising analysis in Kyllo equating reasonableness with typicality in
a limited sense.287  Rather than making the claim that Kyllo
"voluntarily" exposed his house's temperature to the public or that the
possibility of people sensing heat from his house destroyed any
expectation of privacy, the Court held that using technology to detect
"any information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search - at least where
(as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. 288
While better than a jurisprudence of possibility or risk assumption,
this analysis still falls short. First, the Court's "functional equivalent
of trespass" test may work in the context of thermal imaging of a
home, but will likely prove unworkable for other types of
technological searches.8 9 More importantly if, as Justice Antonin
Scalia has stated, "the Fourth Amendment is about privacy . not
solitude, 29 ° the question is not so much whether a particular
obscenity in part as "whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest"
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))).
282 See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 197, 238 (1993) (describing Court's tendency to restrict reach of Fourth
Amendment on crime control grounds).
283 See supra Part II.A.1.
284 See supra Part II.A.2.
285 See supra Part III.A.
286 See Cloud, supra note 274, at 252 (observing that, despite Katz's ruling that
Fourth Amendment protects people not places, Court has held that "different
expectations attach to different physical locations").
287 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
28 Id. (citation omitted).
28 This is likely a result intended by the originalist author of the opinion, as he
openly sought only to preserve "that degree of privacy against government that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." Id. at 34.
290 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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technology is in public use, but rather whether the public generally
uses it in the manner the police seek to use it,291 or indeed, whether it
ought to be used in such a manner. 292  Certainly, a multitude of
privacy-defeating tools are in public use: tools to pick locks, scale
fences, amplify sounds, and see into crevices. Just because they have
the potential to be used in privacy-defeating ways does not mean that
we no longer have privacy expectations whenever they are used.293
A true typicality analysis, independent of the Court's assumptions
about precautionary behavior or protected areas, would do much to
restore the promise of Katz. It would necessitate the rejection of the
assumption of risk analysis in Greenwood and Smith, although,
depending on what our typical expectations are, perhaps not their
conclusions.294 Such a line of analysis would prove more protective of
privacy rights in an increasingly digital world. Courts would not be
able to summarily dismiss privacy claims in ISP information and
electronic communication content on the sole ground that such
information is "exposed" to a third party.2 95  Rather, courts would
have to discern how the average person feels about net privacy.
In addition, a typicality analysis would necessitate a rejection of the
Caballes rule that contraband detection is sui generis.296 Caballes did
29' See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 208 (suggesting that "'general public use' in Kyllo
should be read to mean widespread and lawful use of a device to see or hear the same
things the government seeks to see or hear").
292 See Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment:
Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1393, 1425 (2002) (doubting "conclusion that societal mores concerning privacy are
not transgressed by suspicionless surveillance of the home interior carried out with
devices that are in general public use").
293 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that Kyllo's "general
public use" criterion is "somewhat perverse because it seems likely that the threat to
privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more
readily available"); Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a "Search" Within the Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 49 (2006) ("Once the bright-line rule of Kyllo's
'otherwise-imperceptibility' test without its limitation on general public use is
breached, the Court's options of either freezing the development of technological
devices in some ad hoc manner or permitting unlimited use of very intrusive devices
as they become readily available are not particularly satisfactory.").
294 For example, the Court could not rule, as it did in Greenwood, that there is no
expectation of privacy in trash merely because it has been conveyed to a third party.
See supra Part II.A.2. It could, however, find that society typically believes trash is not
private.
295 At the very least, if unwilling to abandon the third party doctrine, courts should
get it right and not mix the rule from Greenwood and Smith with the rule from Hoffa
and White. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
296 It is likely that we believe the use of such devices in, for example, the airport is
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not attempt to discern society's expectations regarding dog sniffs
because of its myopic focus on the fact of Caballes's guilt. Because the
Court was so concerned with the reasons why the guilty fear dog
sniffs, it gave no thought to the reasons why the average person might
fear that same action.297  This faulty analysis is spurred on by
scholarship intent on drawing a dividing line between the expectations
of the innocent and guilty for Fourth Amendment purposes.298
Arguing that privacy should be innocent-focused misses the important
fact that, in the absence of particularized suspicion, every target of
investigation is an innocent. The Court has long held that the issue of
whether a certain area is private is conceptually distinct from whether
the law enforcement tactic at issue is beneficial to society. 299
There is an interesting moment in history that illustrates the
different impacts an assumption of risk approach and a typicality
approach have on new technology cases. In the early 1990s, cordless
phone technology was fairly new, and certain cordless phone
conversations were picked up inadvertently by neighbors listening to
the AM radio or deliberately by police using low tech interception
devices." ° Some courts, adhering to a Greenwood-type analysis, held
that the possibility of radio interception, whether known or not to the
cordless phone user, created a risk, which the user had to assume, that
any cordless phone call would be intercepted by the police.3 0' The
Fourth Circuit went so far as to argue that people using landlines who
called cordless phone users had no reasonable expectation of privacy
less intrusive than their use in our homes because we exercise some choice to use the
airport and we do not carry out daily intimate activities in the airport. Alternatively,
some may find the use of a sniffer dog during an on-the-street encounter more
intrusive than the use of a hand-held device because of the intimidating nature of a
dog. All these assertions, however, are just mere speculation as the Caballes Court did
not address such issues. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
297 See Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment
Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 723, 745 (1992) (suggesting that Court would come to
right decisions about privacy if they were not always thinking about fact that person
claiming right is criminal).
298 See Colb, supra note 218, at 1482; Loewy, supra note 218, at 1229.
299 See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
300 See, e.g., United States v. McNulty (In re Askin), 47 F.3d 100, 101 (4th Cir.
1995) (interception by police using radio scanner); United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1992) (neighbor picked up calls on AM radio).
301 See Price v. Turner, 260 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2001); McKamey v. Roach,
55 F.3d 1236, 1237 (6th Cir. 1995); McNulty, 47 F.3d at 105; Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d
705, 706 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Carr, 805 F. Supp. 1266, 1271 (E.D.N.C.
1992). In United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 173 n.1 (5th Cir. 1992), the Court
specifically noted the availability of cordless phone scanners to the general public.
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in the content of the conversations.3 °2 Like courts in the Internet
context, the Fourth Circuit dangerously mixed the White/Hoffa rule
with the third party rule:
The common characteristic of the government informant and
the cordless phone user is that they are both unreliable
recipients of the communicated information: one because he
repeats the conversation to law enforcement officers and the
other because he broadcasts the conversation over radio waves
to all within range who wish to overhear. It is this general risk
of unreliability of which White and Hoffa warn, not the specific
risk that the listener is an informant per se.3°3
Frighteningly, the Fourth Circuit established a rule by which content
of any conversation is fair game, unless the defendant takes some
unspecified measures to ensure the "reliability" of fellow conversants
and call carriers.
Compare this approach with the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the issue:
Courts should bear in mind that the issue is not whether it is
conceivable that someone could eavesdrop on a conversation
but whether it is reasonable to expect privacy. No matter how
technologically advanced cordless communication becomes,
some people will always find a way to eavesdrop on their
neighbors. However, "[t]he fact that [Listening] Toms abound
does not license the government to follow suit. '30 5
The court went on to note:
The same holds true for land-based telephone lines. The
equipment needed to tap a regular telephone line can be
purchased for less than $25 at Radio Shack (considerably less
that the cost of a Bearcat scanner) . . . .The fact that some
individuals eavesdrop on regular telephone conversations does
not mean that no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy
for ordinary phone calls.30 6
302 McNulty, 47 F.3d at 105.
303 Id. (citations omitted).
" See supra notes 194-207 and accompanying text (criticizing this analysis); cf.
Kerr, supra note 153, at 830 (asserting that courts finding no protection for cordless
phones embraced trespass theory and were moved by absence of physical phone line
tampering).
305 Smith, 978 F.2d at 179-80 (citations omitted).
306 Id. at 180 n.10. The Court nonetheless ultimately resolved the issue in favor of
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This analysis gives a fairer meaning to the concept of reasonable
expectation and reasonable caution because it does not define
reasonableness by possibility or risk.3"7 Unfortunately, at the time,
most courts held that wireless conversations were not protected by the
Fourth Amendment. It was not until Congress stepped in to regulate
police behavior in that area that people began to enjoy privacy in
wireless communications.3 8 Professor David Sklansky thus sums up
the cordless phone case era as a "sobering" reminder "that
constitutional protections for the confidentiality of telephone
conversation might be extinguished by a widespread risk of private
surveillance made possible by new technology.
309
B. Dealing with the Normativity Problem
Because social expectations can be manipulated by normatively
objectionable means, 310 answering the empirical question is only the
first step in determining whether there ought to be protection under
the Fourth Amendment. The Court must make a normative judgment
about what society is entitled to hold as private, regardless of
prevailing social thought. However, the Court's ability and obligation
to resort to reliance on its own judgment should be secondary to the
empirical evaluation.
Conservative justices, notably Justice Scalia, are extremely wary of
tests in which the Court exercises its "own judgment" to determine
the constitutionality of a government action.1 Conservatives tend to
argue that this puts the Court in place of a super-legislature, creating
law, and abusing its position in the delicate balance of governmental
powers. 3 2  The conservative mantra is that the Court should not
the government. Id. at 181.
307 Cf. cases cited supra note 301.
308 Congress did not step in until 1994. See Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act § 202, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279, 4290-91 (1994)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511 (2000 & Supp. II1 2003)).
309 Sklansky, supra note 6, at 202-03.
310 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing government
gamesmanship and voyeuristic behavior as manipulators of social expectation).
"I See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing majority's evolving standards of decency test as Court "proclaim[ing]
itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral standards").
312 On the one hand, were the Court always to defer to the legislature, there could
simply be no constitutional law. On the other hand, an interventionist Court is open
to charges of being elitist and antidemocratic. This is known as the
"countermajoritarian difficulty." See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962). To temper this
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elevate its own judgment about issues like privacy or death penalty
over the views of the American public.31 3 It is therefore ironic indeed
that the conservative portion of the Court was quickest to substitute
its own beliefs for society's beliefs regarding privacy. It was the
conservative swing of the Court that led reasonableness to be defined
by risk assumption and possibility, rather than majoritarianism.1 4
A conservative might respond that the Court was correct to reject
social definitions of privacy, because such social expectations are
normatively objectionable.3 5 I assert, however, that the resort to a
normative judgment should be made only after finding that society
does not expect privacy in the disputed area. The Constitution is
difficulty, conservatives argue that the only nonpolitical, neutral check on the judicial
power, other than majoritarianism, is text and Framers' intent. See Richard S. Kay,
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and
Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226, 230-34 (1988) (describing originalist position).
However, the idea that "pure" textual interpretation and nonrevisionist constitutional
history exist such that their presumptive use in constitutional interpretation produces
"neutral" results, is hotly disputed. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 221 (1980) (asserting that when person engages in
originalism "she is in a fantasy world more of her own than of the adopters' making").
313 Calling progressive policies antidemocratic and progressives elitist is a favorite
tactic of conservatives opposed to minority rights. Shane B. Kelbley, Note, Reason
Without Borders: How Transnational Values Cannot Be Contained, 28 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1595, 1632 (2005) (observing that conservatives argued against perceived "gay
rights" opinion in Lawrence by asserting that "activist judges" were imposing personal
beliefs on American population); see also Aya Gruber, Navigating Diverse Identities:
Building Coalitions Through Redistribution of Academic Capital - An Exercise in Praxis,
35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1201, 1209 (2005) (discussing "the co-opting of minority
status by privileged members of society").
314 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
315 Indeed, some argue for a presumption of no protection that cannot even be
overcome by the typicality analysis. For example, Professor Kerr asserts that,
regardless of social beliefs about privacy, the only time an expectation of privacy is
"legitimate" is when it finds a source outside of the Fourth Amendment. See Orin S.
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a "Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy?", 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 511-13 (2001). In essence this renders
the Fourth Amendment completely impotent as a source of privacy rights. It becomes
a mere procedural mechanism (possibly duplicative and unnecessary) for ensuring
that state actors do not infringe upon already well-established rights. Kerr
characterized his proposal as a civil libertarian theory, asserting that "by linking
Fourth Amendment protection to the presence of extraconstitutional rights, the
rights-based conception ensures that the government cannot use its mere ability to
invade privacy as a basis for eradicating Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 512-
13. While it is true that bright line baseline controls can serve as a check on a Court
bent on utter eradication of the Fourth Amendment, that observation only readily
supports the conclusion that bright line rules should be set as a floor of constitutional
protection.
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counter-majoritarian in a very specific way - it permits the Court to
supersede majoritarian sentiments when they conflict with
fundamental individual rights.3"6 Thus, the Court ought to be very
circumspect about using the Bill of Rights as a tool to augment police
power contrary to the wishes of the majority.3 17 It follows that there
should be a very high threshold test the Court must satisfy before it
can prioritize its rights-restricting views over the public's rights-
favoring expectations. Perhaps in the most compelling circumstances
this threshold could be met,38 but it certainly was not met in
Greenwood or Caballes.319
It is a different story all together when the Court makes an initial
determination that society typically believes that a certain area is not
private. In this case, the Court has an obligation to determine
whether, regardless of the prevailing beliefs, society ought to be able
to regard the area as private. This is such an important inquiry
because ever-improving technological abilities allow both the
government and private individuals to bypass our typically erected
privacy barriers. 32" The difficulty is determining the right normative
formula for deciding which areas should be private, despite society's
view that they are not clandestine because of technologically enhanced
snooping. One suggestion is for the Court to examine critically the
reasons why there is a prevailing view that the area is not private. If
no privacy is expected only because of systematic government
invasion or the voyeuristic behavior of particularly ambitious deviants,
then the Court should hold that an expectation of privacy in that area
316 See supra note 312 (discussing counter-majoritarian difficulty). See generally
RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 57-60, 88, 110-11 (1985) (asserting that
Constitution is meant to protect individuals from majorities).
317 In addition, arguably the Katz Court never intended to allow the Court to
impose rights restricting views on the populace. See discussion supra Part I.B.
318 For example, in truly exigent situations where the very existence of the nation
is at stake, the Court could declare persons' beliefs that that they are immune from
certain investigative techniques normatively unreasonable. See Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967) ("Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by
a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national
security is a question not presented by this case."). Such a proposition, however,
would likely be very controversial.
319 Although the Court masks assumption of the risk as a moral judgment in the
third party cases, it is simply a rhetorical contrivance that cannot serve as a basis for
ignoring majoritarian views. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
30 See, for example, the technology discussed in supra notes 247-50 and
accompanying text. Consequently, society might harbor a belief that an area is not
private, while simultaneously believing that it should be private.
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is nonetheless reasonable.3 2' Alternatively, the Court might turn back
to the literal list in the Constitution as a baseline of protection, under
which no civilized society can fall.322 In addition, the Court could
develop the distinction between content and noncontent information,
enabling courts to find that the content of communication is protected
even in fora like the web, where advancing technology or popular
fears of hacking, might engender a belief that online communications
are not private.323
CONCLUSION
In the last forty years, the Supreme Court has, literally and
figuratively, trashed Katz. The Court has allowed crime control
concerns to guide it in a manipulative reading of the reasonableness
prong. This has resulted in a body of law in which privacy means
solitude and the police may engage in intrusive actions in the most
intimate of areas - actions that might not have been permitted under
a literalist reading of the Fourth Amendment. The situation has
become so dire that even civil libertarians have proposed going back to
a rules-based regime, reminiscent of Olmstead.
The Court's third party and contraband exceptions prove extremely
dangerous in an increasingly technological world. As more and more
communication is carried out through electronic media, third parties,
or at least their virtual manifestations, have the capability of scanning
all our communications. As crime detection techniques improve,
every citizen is potentially subject to random contraband or
criminality checks. Without even talking about other problematic
aspects of the Court's post-Katz jurisprudence, like standing and plain
view, the third party and contraband cases alone produce a very bleak
view for the future. They create an America in which the scope of the
321 Again, it is difficult to declare the precise formula for determining when this is
the case. One way might be to look at what state laws prohibit. If state laws prohibit
certain privacy-defeating behaviors, and those behaviors are what have destroyed the
societal expectation of privacy, then the government nonetheless must treat the area
as private.
322 The analysis here would look similar to that in Kyllo, with one important
difference: the analysis is not a substitute for the typicality inquiry, it is only used to
restore privacy when the court finds lowered social expectations regarding a
traditionally intimate area. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (drawing
bright line of privacy protection at home).
323 Of course, then there will be issues over what is content and what is
noncontent. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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government's surveillance and data gathering on its own citizens
makes former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover's files look like child's play.
Despite all of its problems, I am not prepared to say that Katz has
gone to the dogs. I believe the Katz test can be a good one with some
modifications. With a little effort, the Katz revolution can still be
realized. The Court must be willing to rethink the doctrines that have
systematically undermined our privacy. If we look at Justice Harlan's
test as a work in progress, we can see that he soon added the
normativity requirement in his White dissent.3 24 In an increasingly
digital world, nature no longer gives us appropriate tools to construct
our own privacy barriers. It is thus more important than ever that the
Court construct legal fortifications to protect our privacy and
withstand arbitrary government invasions.
324 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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